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ABSTRACT
Private equity investments are divided into the five main categories: venture capital,
mezzanine capital, growth equity, leveraged buyouts, and distressed investments.
Currently in China, growth equity is the major type of private equity investments. The
thesis will focus on the investment process of growth equity deals in China. Specifically,
the thesis will analyze the challenges in deal sourcing, valuation and due diligence
processes, deal structuring, and exit strategies.
Private equity sector in China is in its early stage of development and evolving quickly
with huge potentials untapped. While in the developed countries like the U.S., leveraged
buyouts is the main stream of private equity investments, this type of deals is emerging
in China. The thesis will explore the potentials of leveraged buyouts in China through
analyzing the capital market landscape of the country and the case studies.
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Chapter 1: Background Information
1.1. Introduction to Private Equity Investments in China
Private equity is an asset class consisting of equity securities that are not publicly traded
and are available only to "sophisticated" investors such as foundations, endowments,
pension funds, family offices, and other investment channels. Private equity holds long-
term capital commitments from investors and creates value through active management
of the invested companies. Private equity is an expensive source of capital and is
typically used by companies that have exceeded loan limits and have limited access to
public debt and equity markets.
Private equity investments fall into five main categories: venture capital (investing in
young entrepreneurial companies), mezzanine capital (preferred equity investments
senior to common stock), growth equity (large but usually minority investments in stock
of relatively large companies), leveraged buyouts ("LBO", acquiring majority control of a
matured firm from existing public or private shareholders), and distressed investments
(investing in company securities in bankruptcy or close to it). In general, there are three
ways for private equity firms to generate positive risk-adjusted returns: operational
improvement, valuation multiple expansion, and financial leverage'. This thesis will
mainly focus on the growth equity type of private equity investment in China, which has
significantly trailed the U.S. and other western regions in terms of size and depth of
investment vehicles.
The following are the six main steps in the process of private equity investments.
* Planning and fund-raising
Paul A. Gompers, "Introduction to Private Equity Finance", August 17, 2012
6
* Deal sourcing
* Deal valuation and due diligence
" Deal negotiating and structuring
" Portfolio management
. Exit strategies
1.1.. Planning and Fund-raising
In the planning stage, the General Partners (the "GPs") design fund strategy and
structure, and pitch Limited Partners (the "LPs") for funding. The firm and its fund
managers' track records as well as the investment strategies are the key selection
criteria for LPs to select the GPs.
1.1.2. Deal Sourcing
In this stage, private equity firms receive investment opportunities through proprietary
channels and public auctions. Proprietary deal flows are generated through personal and
professional networking of GPs, LPs and advisors as well as referrals from the other
departments of the same financial institutes. Proprietary deals are sold through
confidential negotiations between one bidder and the target company. Public auctions
are often held by the target company's advisors. The target company receives term
sheets from one or more bidders and selects investors based on the deal teams
submitted and agreed upon.
1.1.3. Deal Valuation and Due Diligence
Deals are screened based on the specific investment criteria of the private equity firms.
The initial deal selection is a quick screening process based on basic criteria, such as
deal types (growth equity or LBO deals), deal size (amount of capital to be deployed),
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industry, and the leverage ratio of the target company. Selected deals then undergo a
thorough evaluation process to identify the investment thesis, risks, and return profile.
Private equity firms use various valuation methodologies to determine a valuation band
for investment opportunities. Commonly used valuation methodologies include
"discounted cash flow" ("DCF") method, comparable multiples, Sum-Of-Parts method
and liquidation method. The valuation methods for growth equity investments in China
will be elaborated in the Section 2.3.
Due diligence is the investigation and evaluation on the business performance and key
management of the target company. Initial due diligence is normally conducted by the
investment professionals of private equity firms. If the deals meet with the investment
criteria, the private equity firm will sign a term sheet containing the key investment terms
with the target company. After that, external advisors, such as auditors, legal counsels,
and management consultants, will be hired to conduct a full-scale due diligence on the
target company's financial statements, legal documents (e.g. major contacts and
business incorporation documents), industry and business prospects, as well as backlog.
1.1.4. Deal Negotiating and Structuring
Upon the satisfactory due diligence results, private equity firms will sign the transaction
documents with the target company. The transaction documents include all the deal
terms, such as capital structure of the deal, the financial instruments used for financing
(e.g. a combination of bank loans, high-yield debt, and convertible bonds), covenants,
the capitalization structure after investments, appointment of board members, and so on.
The following shows three commonly used deal structuring methods for growth equity
investments:
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* Preferred Stock pays a fixed dividend with priority over the dividends made on
common stock. This comes in addition to any value appreciation of the preferred
shares. It can be converted into common stock at the option of the holder at any
time, most commonly in the event of an Initial Public Offering ("lPO"). If the target
company generates satisfactory performance, investors will choose to get the
equity share of the company by converting to common stock. If the target
company fails to achieve the promised retums, it will pay back the investment
principal plus dividends. This is the most widely used structure in growth equity
investments.
* Convertible bonds: bonds that can be converted into a pre-determined amount
of the target company's equity at a certain time or after meeting certain
conversion criteria, usually at the discretion of the bondholder. This is also a
widely used structure in growth equity investments. Compared to preferred
shares, the differences are:
- At the end, convertible bonds are still debt, while preferred stock is still equity.
The company is not obligated to pay the preferred stockholders dividends.
- Payments on bonds is less costly as bond interest is paid before tax, which
creates a tax shield; while dividends of preferred stock is paid after tax.
" Debt with warrants: Warrants are attached to the debt instruments as
sweeteners" - options to buy common stock at a specific price in the future and
allow the investors to share the upside potential of the firm.
1.1.5. Portfolio Man gen(2 t
For growth equity investments in China, private equity firms will actively manage portfolio
companies and increase the enterprise value through operational improvements, such
as introducing new clients, providing merger and acquisition ("M&A") advisory,
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streamlining operations, cutting down costs, appointing key management personnel, and
so on. In addition, private equity firms will act as the financial advisors to the target
company, helping to select IPO underwriters, negotiating debt refinancing, advising on
the subsequent rounds of financing, etc. To exert influence in the target company, it is
crucial for private equity investors to secure some board seats.
1.1.6. Exit Strategies
There are four main types of exit strategies for growth equity investments in China:
* IPO: sale of stock to the public market for the first time. This is the most desirable
exit strategy in China, as it will typically yield the highest valuation.
* Trade sales: sales of shares to strategic investors who are in the same industry
or the related industries of the target company. Due to the poor performance of
the stock markets in recent years and Chinese government's restriction on the
amount of IPOs per year, exits through trade sales are growing fast in China.
" Secondary sales: sales of shares to financial investors. This is a result of the
specialization of private equity sector, where funds are getting focused on the
specific stages of a company's development. There are two main types of
secondary sales: sales of LP interests and sales of direct interests. Due to a
limited amount of IPO quotas per year, this type of exit strategy is getting popular
in China as well.
" Redemption: this is the least desired exit method. If the target company fails to
meet the requirements of a qualified IPO or violates the key covenants, the
private equity firm may request to have their shares redeemed by the selling
shareholder. Redemption also often carried related interest changes on the
capital secured and then redeemed.
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My thesis will study the dynamics of growth equity investments in China from entry to
exit through case studies. Specifically, the thesis will analyze the challenges in the fund
raising, deal sourcing, valuation and due diligence processes, deal structuring, portfolio
management and exit strategies.
The private equity sector in China is in its early stages of development and evolving
quickly with huge potential untapped. While in the developed markets like the U.S., the
LBO is the main stream of private equity investments, these types of deals are emerging
in China. My thesis will also explore the potentials of the LBO in China through analyzing
the dynamics of China's capital markets and related case studies.
1.2. Development of Growth Equity Investments in China
The first direct equity investments in China happened in 1989 when the Beijing
government established the China Venturetechno Investment Corp. to support the
growth of local high tech companies. At that time, there was little venture capital
activities in China. The government led the country's private equity investments at this
time. The situation started to change in 2003 when some internet companies, backed by
foreign venture capitals, were successfully listed in NASDAQ. The good returns
achieved motivated foreign private equity firms to pour capital into China and create a
presence. Before 2007, China's private equity sector was dominated by foreign investors
with offshore fund structure (USD-denominated fund) through 2007. Growth equity
investments were the main stream of deal flows. Since 2007, buyout deals have
emerged. At the same time, onshore RMB-denominated funds started to grow. In 2010,
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RMB-denominated funds accounted for 75% of the total funds raised 2. The following
shows the growth of private equity funds raised in China since 2000.
Aggregate Capital Raised (bn USD) No. of Funds
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Source: Chenhao Zhu, Private Equity Funds in China: Structures, Opportunities and Challenges, 2012
Historically, growth equity is the main stream of private equity investments. There are
limited buyout deals and even less LBO deals due to the following reasons.
e Great needs for growth equity investments: with the strong growth of China's
economy, privately owned Chinese enterprises are developing fast and need
growth capital to expand their businesses domestically and internationally. Unlike
the U.S., most industries in China are fragmented with lots of small players
exhibiting high growth rates. These private companies normally choose to grow
organically as there is significant market share for them to grow. Thus, there are
limited M&A and buyout activities in China. Also, most of the privately owned
companies are still managed by the first generation of the founding members, who
prefer to run the company by themselves and not sell their assets.
2 Asia Private Equity Review, "Course Reference Manual, 2010
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* Limited Financing Options: Currently, the corporate bond market is under-
developed in China. Bank financing remains the main source of funding for
businesses. However, the bank financing system in China is partially policy-driven
and generally favors the large state-owned enterprises (the "SOEs"). Also, the
Chinese government puts strict loan quotas and approval criteria on the banks so
as to control over-heating economy and inflation risks. This further limits the loan
that privately owned companies can get from the banks. Moreover, private equity
firms in China have very limited access to the debt market, which is a major
funding source for LBO deals.
Currently, the penetration of private equity in China as a percentage of GDP is about 0.3%
as compared to North America's 0.8% and Europe's 0.5%3. Private equity investments
play an important role in helping the businesses development. Without the participation
of private equity funds, many global corporations would not have grown into what they
are today. Also, private equity funds play a key role in corporate restructuring and
turnaround situations. For example, in the bankruptcy case of Countrywide plc, a leading
residential real estate agent in the U.K., the private equity firm Oaktree Capital
Management helped the company to finish the restructuring process, saved it from the
slowing down of the U.K. housing market in 2008, and turned it into a profitable business
in future periods.
Looking forward, the Chinese government will continue to support the private equity
investments in China. With the consolidation of many industries and the growth of bond
market, we will see more M&A activities and LBO deals.
3 Yong Kwek Ping, "Private Equity in China: Challenges and Opportunities", 2012
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Chapter 2: Making Growth Equity Investments in China
2.1. Fund Structure and Fund Raising
There are mainly three types of private equity structures4 in China:
2.1.1. Offshore USD-denominated Funds
Most growth equity funds are using this type of structure, which is formed overseas,
most commonly in Cayman Islands or British Virgin Islands. Comparing with entities
governed by laws in mainland China, investors have greater certainty and predictability
of legal enforceability of contracts as well as the limited liability protection on LPs under
the laws of Cayman Islands or British Virgin Islands.
However, this type of structure has its limitations in the People's Republic of China (the
"PRC"). Many sectors and industries are closed to foreign investors, such as media and
telecommunication. Also, all foreign investments need government approval with length
process. Moreover, as USD-denominated funds with investments in RMB, the
conversion of USD to RMB and the associated repatriation is time consuming. To
circumvent the restrictions, foreign investors typically invested in an offshore holding
entity that controls a Chinese domestic company by captive contractual arrangements
(please refer to Section 2.5.3. VIE Structure). This type of investments mainly exits
through overseas IPO.
2.1.2. Onshore Domestic-invested RMB-denominated Funds
This type of funds is registered in mainland China, consisting exclusively of domestic
sources of capital. Due to the abundant "hot money" available in China and fewer
restrictions than USD-denominated funds, this type of funds is growing very fast.
4 Chenhao Zhu, Private Equity Funds in China: Structures, Opportunities and Challenges, 2012
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Because of the currency control, RMB-denominated funds mainly raise funds
domestically. The LPs are mostly National Social Security Foundation, local government
funds held by provincial and municipal authorities, and high-net-worth individuals. As
domestic investors, they can invest in certain restricted industries not available for
foreign investors. Currently, RMB funds are taking the leads to do buyout deals in China.
However, this type of funds faces more uncertainty in enforcing contracts in the courts in
mainland China. Also, unlike the USD funds that have a large group of institutional
investors such as endowments, foundations, pension funds and family offices, the LP
community in China is relatively limited (as listed above). In addition, due to the different
corporate culture and lower pay than offshore incorporated funds, domestic invested
funds find it hard to attract seasoned international investment professionals.
2.1.3. Onshore Foreign-invested RMB-denominated Funds
The type of funds is registered in mainland China, comprising at least partial overseas
capital. It avoids some of the disadvantages of USD funds and domestic-invested RMB
funds. Compared to USD funds, it bypasses the burdensome process approval by
Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM") and can exit through the domestic stock market.
Compared with domestic-invested RMB funds, foreign-invested RMB funds are able to
attract experienced international investment professionals more easily.
A main disadvantage of this type of funds is that as foreign investors, they are not
allowed to invest in certain restricted industries (as mentioned above). In addition, the
local partners may not be as sophisticated as the international investors; their lack of
investment experience and cultural differences may lead to conflicts with foreign
partners.
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Foreign-invested RMB funds are growing fast. Some multinational private equity funds
are raising their RMB funds in China. For example, Blackstone is obtaining regulatory
approval to launch a RMB fund in Shanghai with a target fund size of RMB5 billion.
Carlyle Group has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Beijing government
in 2010 to set up its first RMB fund in China, aiming to raise RMB5 billion as well.
Goldman Sachs has announced the partnership with the Capital Operation and
Management Center, which is owned by the Beijing municipal government, to set up the
Broad Street (Beijing) RMB fund - a growth capital fund up to RMB5 billion.
The following chart shows a growth comparison between USD- and RMB-denominated
funds in China.
$ billions
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Source: Chenhao Zhu, Private Equity Funds in China: Structures, Opportunities and Challenges, 2012
2.2.Deal Sourcing in China
Deal sourcing in China has several characters which differ from the developed markets.
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2.2.1. Guangxi Management
The importance of relationships ("Guanxi" in Chinese) is widely cited by foreigners. It is
often regarded as one of the most important prerequisites for doing business in China.
Having strong Guanxi, or relationships, with the right people facilitates the process of the
private equity investments including fund-raising, deal sourcing, getting deal approvals
from the government, and so on. In many people's eyes, good Guanxi with powerful
political figures, such as the government or important people closely related to them,
assists a great deal in sourcing proprietary deals in China. GPs seek help from the local
government to make the introductions to the local entrepreneurs. This makes
entrepreneurs obligated to meet with the private equity funds in order to give face to the
government.
However, private equity is a long-term business with more than a 5-year investment
horizon. It is thus very important for private equity firms not to focus too much on
relationship building or even get involved in bribery to earn themselves some short-term
benefits. Guanxi management may go wrong if the power changes hands or bribery was
disclosed; and the business will be shut down as a result. Integrity is still very important
in investments. Sometimes, it is wiser to give up opportunities of making quick money at
the expense of exposing the fund to Guanxi risk.
When building Guanxi with Chinese government officials, the key is to help them
develop a career path and get promotions, but importantly, not anything in monetary
terms. Private equity firms should deliver clear messages to the government officials as
to how the investments can help develop the local economy, fuel GDP growth, increase
job opportunities, help build up local brands; and improve infrastructure and people's
lives. In return, the private equity firms could then request for the government's support
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in approving investments and introduce them to the local entrepreneur community. More
importantly, should any disputes arise between entrepreneurs and the private equity firm,
senior government officials are more likely to be fair in handling the dispute if the
investment will help them get promoted.
Case Study: Shienzhei Capital Group
Shenzhen Capital Group Company, Ltd. ("SCGC") is one of the earliest domestic private
equity firms in China. It was established in 1999 by the Shenzhen government to bridge
the gap between the growing small and medium enterprises (the "SM Es") in Shenzhen
and the lack of financing resources. It is regarded as a successful model of "government
backed, market oriented, operated within economy rules, and head upon international
practice."
By the end of July 2010, the firm had expanded into 29 provinces and built a national
network of local funds that was unparalleled in China's private equity industry. Its total
fund size has reached RMB20 billion. Since its inception, SCGC has invested RMB6
billion in 287 companies. It has pursued attractive investment opportunities across a
wide range of industries and investment stages. It made 67% of its investments in the
south and south-east regions of China, especially in Shenzhen, while the remainder was
widely distributed in other regions of China.
SCGS pioneered the government-backed fund (the "GBF") structure in China. In a
typical GBF, investments come from three parties: the local government, SCGC, and
local partnership funds (mainly local private investors), with each contributing about one-
third of the total fund commitment. The compensation structure is similar to the typical
s Paul Gompers, Shaohui Chen, Jessie Lin, Shelley Ling, "Shenzhen Capital Group", 2012
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private equity firms' funds, with a 2% to 2.5% annual management fee and a 20%
carried interest rate. The investments by local governments have the terms that are
similar to those of a bank loan, charging a fixed annual rate based on the Chinese
government bond rate (around 4%-5%). The return and principal investments to the
government is guaranteed in the GBF contract. After paying the fixed return to the
government, SCGC and other investors share the rest on a pro forma basis.
SCGC benefits greatly from the local governments' strong support in deal sourcing, deal
execution and exiting. This structure is intended to support the growth of local
enterprises and to spur the development of local economy.
Investment managers in regional offices work with local governments and regional
partnership funds to identify local deals. These regional deals contributed about 60% to
70% of total leads in SCGC. Investment managers in SCGC's other types of funds,
when searching deals in a national scope, might also refer deals to other GBF teams
when there is a geographic fit.
By building a national network of 30 regional GBFs, SCGC can achieve comprehensive
deal coverage that is superior to most foreign VC funds. Both the local governments and
partnership funds are important deal sourcing channels. Compared to most VC firms,
which only have offices in Beijing or Shanghai and make their investment professionals
fly all over the country to source deals, SCGC's physical footholds become a strategic
advantage in a competitive investment market. As a result, the SCGC is able to invest in
companies that cover more than 29 provinces in China.
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2.2.2. Some Potential Areas for Deal Sourcing
In the private equity sector in China, there is a saying "Too much money chasing too few
deals." Investors are complaining that good deals are getting scarce and valuations are
driven up by intense competition among funds. To a certain extent, the increasing
number of foreign and local private equity firms made high-profile large scale growth
equity deals very expensive. Also, USD-denominated funds are facing strong
competition from increasing RMB-denominated funds. Some Chinese companies prefer
to work with RMB funds due to a less time-consuming investment process (as discussed
above). However, with the fast growth of China's economy, there are lots of potential
deal opportunities besides growth equity investments, such as M&A and investing in
SMEs.
2.2.2.1. M&A Opportunities
Many industries in China are highly fragmented with few dominant players. Thus, there
is a high potential for market consolidation in those industries. The food and beverage
sector, for example, is flooded with thousands of brands and companies, most of which
are small players with poor quality products. There are huge M&A opportunities in this
industry. Private equity firms could seek and invest in private companies with premium
quality products and help the invested companies to acquire smaller competitors and
increase their market share.
Also, the Chinese government encourages SOEs and large privately-owned enterprises
to consolidate certain industries, such as securities, consumer products, and automobile
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manufacturing6 . Through helping portfolio companies conduct M&A, private equity firms
can increase their deal-sourcing options to invest in smaller companies.
2.2.2.2. Investing beyond Growth Equity Deals
Currently, USD denominated- funds mainly focus on flagship growth equity deals - big
companies with famous brand names, being a market leader, and having stable cash-
flows. However, those types of companies normally have abundant funding sources.
Therefore, they are very picky in selecting investors; and their valuation is high.
According to an article in Wall Street Journal7, currently China has developed a "two-
track" economy, with the state-owned sectors are flooded with cash; while the private
sectors are starving for funding. There are about 40 million companies in China which
account for 80% of the country's jobs and more than half of economic output. As a result
of recent tightening of bank lending to curb inflation, as of the end of June 2011, there
are about RMB288 billion ($45 billion) of loans arranged by 3,366 non-banking
institutions specializing in letters of credit.
Therefore, private equity firms could be more flexible in providing financing to privately
owned companies, instead of just focusing on growth equity investments in market
leaders. Other types of financing structures such as mezzanine debt and high yield
notes can provide private equity firms with more potential deal opportunities. Moreover,
SMEs are increasingly starving for funding as opposed to large SOEs. But currently,
USD-denominated funds are still skeptical about investing in these types of companies.
The local RMB-denominated funds have a better understanding of the local market and
6 Yong Kwek Ping, "Private Equity in China: Challenges and Opportunities", 2012
7 Lingling Wei, "China's New Lenders of Last Resort," Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2011
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are more likely to invest in the SMEs, which will further fuel the high growth of local
funds.
2.3. Valuation
Valuation of growth equity investments in China has several issues that the developed
markets do not have. Specifically, the valuation need to consider the additional
complexities of investing in emerging markets, the trading comparable, and the
appropriate discount rate.
2.3.1. Trading Comparable
For growth equity investments in China, trading comparable method is the most
frequently used valuation method. The target company gives investors one- or two-year
post-investment earning guarantees. Investors will then choose a trading multiple and
multiply the guaranteed earnings to get the post-money valuation. Commonly used
valuation multiples for growth equity deals in China are P/E, TEV/EBITDA, and
Price/Book.
The challenge here is to find the proper trading multiples. In China, there are three stock
exchanges: the Shanghai Stock Exchange ("SHSE"), the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
("SZSE"), and the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited ("SEHK"). SHSE and SZSE
are located in mainland China, where stocks traded are collectively called "A-shares".
The A-share market is not entirely open to foreign investors due to tight capital account
controls by authorities in mainland China; the trading currency is RMB. SEHK is located
in Hong Kong. The stock traded is called "H-share". SEHK is fully open to international
investors; the trading currency is HKD. The parties that trade H-shares are mostly
international institutional investors. Due to the difference of capital availability and
expected returns, the trading multiples between SEHK and SHSE/SZSE are different,
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even for the same company. Appendix A shows a market capitalization comparison of
the companies dual-listed in SEHK (H-shares) and SHSE/SZSE (A-sharers). On
average, for the dual-listed stocks, A-shares have a 26% valuation premium compared
with H-shares. To makes things more complicated, many Chinese companies choose to
get listed overseas. Popular stock exchanges include the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE"), the NASDAQ Stock Market ("NASDAQ"), the Singapore Stock Exchange, and
so on.
Therefore, it is important to find comparable stocks traded in a stock exchange where
the invested company plans to get listed. If no such comparable is available, then a
valuation discount or premium needs to be applied to adjust the valuation differences
among different stock exchanges.
2.3.2. Types of DCF Valuation Methods
Three types of DCF valuation methods can be used to value growth equity investments.
" Weighted average cost of capital ("WACC") approach: discount the cash flow to
capital by adjusting the tax effects on the cost of capital, applicable when the
target company's capital structure is expected to remain constant during the
forecasting period (constant Debt/Equity ratio). This method is not applicable in
corporate restructuring or LBO situations.
WACC = (Debt/Asset)*Rdbt*(1 - tax rate) + (Equity/Asset)*Rquiy
" The adjusted present value ("APV") approach: separate cash flow generated by
the business and by the interest tax shields, and discount them using different
discount rates. Free cash flow generated by the business could be discounted by
the expected rate of return on the firm's assets - Rasset. Cash flow from interest
tax shields could be discounted by the cost of debt or risk free rate (if the target
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firm is sure about the occurrence of interest tax shields). This method is
applicable in both situations when the capital structure of the target company is
expected to change or to remain constant.
R..e= Rinsk,,+ p.,* market risk premium
The capital cash flow ("CCF") approach: acknowledge the different streams of
cash flows from the business and interest tax shields, but use a single discount
rate - the expected rate of return on the firm's assets - Rass,. The main
difference from the APV method is that the tax shields are discounted at a higher
rate - Rasset (if the target firm is not quite sure about the occurrence of interest tax
shields). This method is applicable in both changing and constant capital
structure situations.
2.3.3. Terminal Value as a Multiple of Earnings
This method is more applicable for growth equity deals in China than the DCF method
with Terminal Value as a Growing Perpetuity Cash Flow because it is hard to determine
the perpetual growth rate g in a fast growing company.
China's GDP growth from 2012 to 2014 is expected to range from 7.6% to 8.4%,
respectively 8 . The average net profit growth of the CSI 300 Index 9 component
companies from 2012 to 2014 is estimated to be 1.2%, 9% and 12.5%, respectively9.
The average net profit growth rate of SME Board in China was about 10% in 2011 and is
estimated to be 29% in 2012 and 31% in 201310. The fast growth of SMEs made the
financial forecast on growth equity deals difficult. Target company's management and
industry experts are normally able to make 3-Years financial forecast. Beyond that, it is
8 Goldman Sachs: "A-share strategy - 2013 outlook", December, 2012
9 The CSI 300 is a capitalization-weighted stock market index designed to replicate the performance of 300
stocks traded in the SHSE and SZSE, The CSI 300 Index sample covers about 60% of total value of A
Share market
10 China International Capital Corporation Ltd., "Analysis of SME Board and GEM Board Mid-term Financial
Result and Forecast", July 18, 2012
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difficult to predict the growth rate of the market and the target company. Thus, it is hard
to determine when the terminal growth rate g will get stabilized, which makes the
method of Terminal Value as Growing Perpetuity Cash Flow not commonly used to
value growth equity investments in China.
Also, the method of Terminal Value as a Multiple of Earnings is more practical for growth
equity investment than the method of Growing Perpetuity Cash Flow, as the ultimate
goal of the private equity investment is to exit, and the comparable multiple method
reflects the market expectation of the firm value at the exit, which gives a better picture
of the return profile.
The procedures of DCF method with Terminal Value as a Multiple of Earnings are as
follows:
1. Estimate the time when the investment exit will take place (e.g in 5 years)
2. Forecast the firm's EBITDA or net earnings at the time of exit, use TEV/EBITDA
multiples from comparable public firms or from recent transactions in the same
industry to calculate the total market value of the firm at exit
3. Choose a discount rate
4. Calculate the present value of the firm
5. Do a sensitivity analysis using different discount rates
Case Study: Shenzhou International
The following shows a valuation of Shenzhou International (SEHK: 2313), a China-
based manufacturer of casual wear, sportswear, and lingerie. Its major customers
include Nike, Adidas, Puma, and Uniqlo. Using a WACC ranging from 11.2% to
13.2% (the current WACC is 11.2%) and EV/EBITDA multiple between 8x to 10x (the
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current trading multiple is 9.6x), the target stock price is $3.5 - $4.5 (HKD27.1 -
HKD34.9). As of March 22, 2013, its trading price is HKD21.8 ($2.8). The stock price
has an upside potential of 40%-60%.
USD in millions
Proected FYE Dec 31
12131112 12131113 12/31114 12131115 12/31116
EBITDA $ 393 $ 459 $ 557 $ 669 $ 796
EBIT $ 349 $ 405 $ 490 $ 588 $ 699
Less: Taxes on EBIT $ (63) $ (73) $ (89) $ (106) $ (126)
% tax rate
Unlevered Net income $ 286 $ 332 $ 401 $ 482 $ 573
Add: D&A $ 44 $ 55 $ 67 $ 81 $ 97
Less: Increase in W.C. $ (52) $ (70) $ (107) $ (123) $ (141)
LesS: CapEx $ (118) $ (136) $ (165) $ (198) $ (236)
UFCF $ 160 $ 180 $ 196 $ 241 $ 293
Market Assumptions
Risk Free Rate
Equity Market Risk Premium
Capitalization
Cash
Total Debt
Total Equity
Debt to Equity Ratio
Financini and Tax Assumptions
Pre-tax Cost of Debt
Marginal Tax Rate
Cash Interest Rate
3 00%
7 00%
Pro Forma
25%
Historical Data Source: Capital IQ
Equity Market Risk Premium Sensitivity
Levered Cost of Equity _ WACC
Beta 6.00%/ 7.00% 8.00% 6.00% 7.00% 8.00%
1.14 9.9% 11.0% 12.2% 8.5% 9.5% 10.4%
1.29 10.7% 12.0% 13.3% 9.3% 10.3% 11.4%
1.43 11.6% 13.0% 14.4% 10.0% 11.2% 12.3%
1.57 12.4% 14.0% 15.6% 10.7% 12.0% 13.3%
1.72 13.3% 15.0% 16.7% 11.4% 12.8% 14.2%
Note: Shenzhou's 5-Year Beta is 1.43 (from Capital IQ)
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The discount rate used in this method is suggested to be higher than the one used in the
DCF method with terminal value as a growing perpetuity cash flow, because there is an
idiosyncrasy risk imbedded. The comparable multiples used here are a kind of
idiosyncrasy risk, as one assumes that the target company can get an IPO in Year 5 with
the same valuation multiples as the trading comparable. However, this may not be true
as most comparables are public companies with a proven business model, as well as
large scale and stable cash flow. It is uncertain whether the target private company will
reach the same valuation multiples as the public comparable at the time of exit.
Therefore, a higher discount rate should be used in the base/downside case of valuation
model. Or a discount to the valuation multiples should be used to calculate the terminal
value at exit.
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DCF Valuation Matrix - EVIEBITDA Terminal Value
Less: Taxes on EBIT
Terminal Value EVIEBITDA Multiple
WACC 8.Ox 9.0x 10.0x
11.2% $ 496 $ 496 $ 496 PVofUFCF
$ 4,171 $ 4,693 $ 5,214 PVof Terminal Value
$ 4,667 $ 5,189 $ 5,710 Enterprise Value
Less: Net Debt
$ 4,679 $ 5,201 $ 5,722 Equity Value
1,260 1,260 1,260 Weighted Avg. Basic Shares Out.
$ 3.7 $ 4.1 $ 4.5 Implied stock price
12.2% $ 487 $ 487 $ 487 PVofUFCF
$ 4,025 $ 4,528 $ 5.031 PVof Terminal Value
4,511.6 5,014.7 5,517.7 Enterprise Value
Less: Net Debt
$ 4,524 $ 5,027 $ 5,530 Equity Value
1,260 1,260 1,260 Weighted Avg. Basic Shares Out.
$ 3.6 $ 4.0 $ 4.4 Implied stock price
13.2% $ 478 $ 478 $ 478 PVofUFCF
$ 3,884 $ 4,370 $ 4,855 PVof Terminal Value
4,362.6 4,848.1 5,333.6 Enterprise Value
Less: Net Debt
$ 4,375 $ 4,860 $ 5,346 Equity Value
1,260 1,260 1,260 Weighted Avg. Basic Shares Out.
$ 3.5 $ 3.9 $ 4.2 Implied stock price
Z.3.4. Choosing Appropriate Discount Rate for Emerging Markets
There are two common ways of adjusting the calculation of DCF valuation. The first
method is to incorporate the risks into the discount rate; while the second is to adjust the
cash flows. Adjusting the discount rate is appropriate when the risks are not diversifiable
(systematic risk) and constant over time.
"What type of discount rate to use?" This is a constant argument in the investment field.
Especially in the emerging countries, this issue becomes more complicated.
2.3.4.L Discount Rate Reflecting Investor's Required Rate of Return
Some academic research papers suggest that the discount rate should reflect the
required return of the ultimate investors. For example, in China, there are USD-
denominated private equity funds and RMB-denominated private equity funds. The LPs
of USD-denominated funds are large international institutions such as pension funds and
endowments in the U.S. These investors are generally well diversified and hold portfolios
close to the global market portfolio. Therefore, it is appropriate for these investors to use
the values of risk free rate, P, and equity risk premium from the global market portfolio.
The LPs of RMB-denominated funds are mainly domestic financial institutes and high-
net-worth individuals. In this case, risk free rate, P, and equity risk premium in China
should be used.
In this method, for USD-denominated funds, the risk free rate is suggested to be the U.S.
government bond rate that matches the expected length of the investment. For RMB-
denominated funds, the risk free rate in China should be used. In this case, to isolate
China's risk free rate, one needs to calculate the default spread (as discussed in the
section 2.3.4.4.) and then subtract it from the bond rate.
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The choice of equity risk premium depends on where the LPs come from. LPs of USD-
denominated funds are typically large and well-diversified investors; the appropriate
equity risk premium should be the global portfolio or their own portfolio. For local LPs of
a RMB-denominated fund, the appropriate premium should be derived from the local
equity market, such as A-share or H-share market.
2.3.4.2. Discount Rate Reflecting Investment Target's Business Risk
Other academic research believes that the appropriate discount rate should reflect the
business risk associated with the expected cash flows. If the target and acquirer are in
the same industry, then both parties' WACC and Rasst may be justified. If the WACCs
and Ras.et are likely to be different, then you need to use the target's WACC or RasW,
because you are concerned about the risk of where the money is going, not where it
comes from.
In this method, the risk free rate should be the Chinese government bond rate that
matches the expected length of the investment. The market risk premium should be
derived from the local equity market in China.
In practice, the discount rate reflecting the investment target's business risk is used
more often in growth equity investments in China. Most USD- and RMB-denominated
funds use the discount rate reflecting the target's business risk in China. Private equity
investors are generally conservative. Compared to the discount rate used in the first
method, the second one generally adopts a higher risk free rate and equity market risk
premium. Thus it generates a higher discount rate and gives the investment target a
lower valuation.
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Choosing p
For growth equity deals in China, it may be difficult to find similar firms in the local stock
exchanges, especially when the trading multiples in SEHK and the stock exchanges in
mainland China are different. A possible solution is to assume that the firm is equally
exposed to the market risk as similar firms in developed markets and use the P of those
similar firms in the same industry as the target company".
2.3.4.4. Equity Market Premium and Country Risk Premium
A difference affecting valuation calculation in emerging countries like China is the
presence of country-specific risk, as the investments in emerging countries is riskier than
those in the developed countries like the U.S. The specific risks in China include risks
associated with a different legal environment, uncertain legal enforcement, regulatory
risk, risk of expropriation, currency exchange risk, and so on.
In practice, investors will add an arbitrary country risk premium to their discount rate.
Also, making adjustments to the discount rate rather than the cash flow is less arbitrary
because there are methods to derive a country risk premium using the default spread for
sovereign debt. One way is to calculate bond default spread12 . For example, the one-
year dollar-denominated Chinese bond has an interest rate of 3% while the U.S. one
year T-bill rate is 1.5%. Then the country premium for China is calculated as:
Country Premium of China = 3% - 1.5% = 1.5%
Paul Gompers, Victoria Ivashina, Timothy Dore, "Private Equity Valuation in Emerging Markets", 201212 Aswath Damodaran, "Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation andimplications - The 2012
Edition", March 2012
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2.3.4.3.
The other way is to get Credit Default Swap ("CDS") Spreads for the countries
(governments) that yield measures of default risk 3. The following shows the risk premia
of some countries.
Enter the current risk premium for a mature equity market
Adjust the country default spread for the additional volatility of the equity market to get to a country premium?
If yes, enter the multiplier to use on the default spread
6.00%
Yes
.I I
Country Risk Premia as of January 2013
Local Bond Rating- Total Equity Country Cos Total Equity Country
Currency based Default Risk Risk Default Risk Risk
Country Rating Spread Premium' Premium2  Spread Premium Premium 3
Brazil Baa2 1.75% 8.63% 2.63% 2.07% 8.06% 2.06%
China Aa3 0.70% 7.05% 1.06% 1.80% 7.65% 1.65%
Hong Kong Aal 0.25% 6.38% 0.38% 1.19% 6.74% 0.74%
India Baa3 2.00% 9.00% 3.00% NA NA NA
Indonesia Baa3 2.00% 9.00% 3.00% 2.69% 8.99% 2.99%
Russia Baal 1.50% 8.25% 2.25% 2.91% 9.32% 3.32%
United Kingdom Aaa 0.00% 6.00% 0.00% 0.95% 6.38% 0.38%
United States of America Aaa 0.00% 6.00% 0.00% 0.70% 6.00% 0.00%
Note 1: Total Equity Risk Premium = Risk Premium of a Matured Equity Market (6%)+Country Risk Premium
Note 2: Country Risk Premium (Bond Default Spread Method) = Rating Based Default Spread* Volatility Adjustment Factor(1.5)
Note 3: Country Risk Premium (CDS Default Spread Method) = Rating Based Default Spread* Volatility Adjustment Factor(1.5)
Source: Asweth Damodamn, Country Default Spreads and Risk Piemiums, 2013
hlppages.stem.nyu.edul-adamodanNew HomePagealfle&Uryptem.hnl
2.3.4.5. Other Factors to Consider
In practice, the discount rate will also be affected by many other issues, such as deal
structures, scarcity of deal flows, degree of risk, value added by investors, quality of
management, and so on. The following graph illustrate of the various factors affecting
the discount rate.
1 Aswath Damodaran, "Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation and Implications - The
2012 Edition", March 2012
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2011
2.3.5. Adjusting Cash Flows
While adjusting the discount rate is to reflect systematic risk; adjusting cash flows is to
reflect the specific / idiosyncratic risks. The method of adding country risk premium to
the discount rate assumes that all investments in the country are affected equally.
However, the probability of expropriation, for instance, is different for an oil firm than for
a consumer products firm. Scenario analysis of cash flows easily allow for risks to vary
over time. For example, the risk of expropriation of an oil field may decline over time. In
this case, increasing the discount rate to account for the expropriation risk assumes that
the risk is constant over time and will lead to an undervaluation of the investment.
Considering a company-specific risk - the business of a freight forwarding company is
positively correlated with the economy. If the domestic GDP increases by 3%, the freight
forwarder's revenue will increase by 6% (assume the revenue P is 2). Economists
forecast that there is a 25% probability that the domestic economy will go into recession
in the next 2 years with a GDP growth of -2%; 25% probability that the GDP growth is
1 Paul Gompers, Victoria Ivashina, Timothy Dore, "Private Equity Valuation in Emerging Markets", 2012
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0%, and 50% probability that the GDP growth will reach 3% in the next 2 years. Suppose
the firm has a projected cash flow of $100 in Year I and $110 in Year 2. The following
shows the equation to account for this risk by adjusting the cash flows.
N
f(x) = * Probability of Scenario j * (1 + expected GDP Growth) t )
j=1
t = the year of the cash flow
The expected cash flows in year 1 would be:
100*25%*(1+2*(-2%))+100*25%*(1+2*0%)+100*50%*(1+2*3%)=$102
The expected cash flows in year 2 would be:
100*25%*(1+2*(-2%))A2+100*25%*(1+2*O%)A2+100*50%*(1+2*3%) A2=$104.22
Using a discount rate of 10%, the net present value is $178.86.
2.3.6. Valuation Obstacles in China
The valuation is typically a big obstacle in M&As and trade sales in China. Compared
with the developed markets, there are a lot more disagreements between buyers and
sellers in China. One of the reasons is that due to the less efficient financial market, the
valuation in emerging countries is more complicated than that in the developed countries.
Another reason is that local investors and entrepreneurs are less knowledgeable on
valuation methodologies than those in developed countries.
The valuation given by the Chinese trade buyers are often low. The comparable and net
asset valuation methods are commonly used; and the DCF method is not often used.
Investors are unwilling to pay for the intrinsic value of intangible items, such as
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management competency and brand name. Buyers would request an arbitrarily big
discount on the valuation when using comparables in developed markets; while the
sellers would not agree with the discount rate. In addition, the actual financial
performance is usually different from the numbers provided by the Chinese firms, which
makes the buyers even more conservative about the valuation.
2.4. Due Diligence
Due diligence is a process that critically reviews and analyzes the financial, legal,
management and operational conditions of a company. It is the process through which
the buyer and the seller get to know each other, a key step in private equity investments,
and plays an important role in many other business transactions, including M&A, IPO,
and licenses. Appendix B shows a brief Due Diligence Check List.
2.4.1. Steps of Due Diligence
The following shows the major procedures of the due diligence.
Steps Tasks Involves
Receive Initial Teaser Get basic knowledge of the target.
Draft Preliminary DD Use company's forecast models, analyst reports, company
List website, industry journals, website of industry associate, news
search, comparable companies' prospectus and annual reports
(for market and competitive analysis) to get a better
understanding of the company and its market.
Conference Calls and Interact with the management to gain firsthand information
Site Visits about the operations and form direct impression of the
management's capability.
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Draft Preliminary Outline the major material terms and conditions (please refer to
Terms (term sheet) Appendix C for a sample term sheet of growth equity deal). If
both parties agree to the preliminary terms, 3 rd parties including
legal counsels, auditors, and other advisors will be engaged to
conduct a full-scale due diligence process.
Full-scale due Investors get access to dataroom, management presentation,
diligence 3"d parties conduct interview, site visits and inspection.
Follow-up and Review of due diligence results, assess issues discovered,
Review impacts on valuation and investment terms.
The following shows all parties get involved in due diligence and their corresponding
responsibility.
Parties Major responsibilities
Private equity 0 Review due diligence reports from the 3rd party advisors.
investors 0 Assess the quality of financial forecasts by the target
company, conduct sensitivity analysis, create valuation band.
* Conduct conversation with the management of target
company. Evaluate the capabilities and credit-worthiness of
the key management.
* Assess the feasibility of transaction, discover potential
problems and find solutions.
Auditors * Review financial and tax records, assess the quality and
accuracy of financial statements.
* Issue opinion on the company's historical financial reports and
tax compliance, and give adjustment suggestions.
Legal counsels * Review all legal documents including incorporation
documents, leases, licenses, purchase and supply contracts,
patents, financing agreements, employment contracts, etc.
* Issue legal due diligence report regarding existing and
potential legal issues.
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Consultants e Additionally hire consultants in specialized areas, according to
(industry-specific, industry-specific characteristics and deal features to discover,
environmental, HR) assess and give solutions to potential problems in these
areas.
2.4.2. Major Considerations in China
e Financial Due Diligence
Private equity firms often find the financial information of Chinese firms not reliable. A
common issue faced by foreign investors in China is the different sets of accounting
books that Chinese firms maintain. The recent wave of suspensions and de-listings of
Chinese companies listed in the U.S. due to the accounting irregularities reveal the
seriousness of this problem. How to conduct financial due diligence in China becomes a
tough question for investors, as the historical information of the target company and their
competitors is very limited.
Besides hiring audit firms and investment banks to aid the due diligence process, a long-
term, ongoing dialogue with key management usually occurs before agreeing to develop
a partnership. Through numerous meetings, phone calls and site visits, investors get a
feeling of the management's integrity and business risks. In addition to that, private
equity firms should seek the third-party's feedbacks on the target company, including
opinions of government officials, industry experts, suppliers, and customers. To double
check the accuracy of the historical revenue and to confirm the financial forecasts,
private equity firms should hire management consultants to help estimate the market
size, the target company's market share, and the market growth. In addition, background
check on key management will sometimes be conducted to ensure the integrity of the
management.
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* Relationship with Management
Similar to venture capital in the U.S. market, private equity in China is a local,
relationship-driven business. To successfully manage and exit an investment, besides
getting satisfactory results from due diligence, the cooperation between investors and
management to develop the business is equally important. Therefore, whether the
management is cooperative and easy to work with is a key consideration for private
equity investors to select deals. Many times, a lack of confidence in management
becomes a deal-breaker.
e Enforceability of Contacts
Compared with the developed market, the legal system, and enforceability of contracts
in China is weaker. Private equity firms in China should be aware of the risks of
overreliance on contacts as a way to reduce fraud risk. A solution to reduce the risk is
through a valuation adjustment mechanism and deal structuring (as discussed in Section
2.5 Deal Structuring).
2.5. Deal Structuring
Deal structuring is a set of arrangements negotiated between the private equity firm and
the investee company to reconcile their different needs and concerns with respect to a
specific deal. The issues to be settled include capital structure and financing instruments
to be used, pricing of the deal, warranties, and covenants, investors' right, and so on.
Compared with the developed markets, deal structuring for growth equity investments in
China have its own distinct features.
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2.5.1. Protecting Minority Shareholders' Rights
Growth equity deals in China are minority shareholding investments. As China's legal
system and enforceability of contracts are still weak, the deal structuring plays a crucial
role in protecting minority shareholders' rights, achieving control to protect expected
return, and avoiding any necessary liability. Appendix C is a term sheet sample for
minority shareholding growth equity investments. The major material terms are as
following:
Deal Structure
" Performance-Based Adjustment
" Liquidation Preference (original
purchase price plus declared
but unpaid dividends)
" Anti-Dilution Provisions
Functions
* Valuation adjustment mechanism to ensure a
reasonable return given the level of risk in the
deal.
* Liquidation Events 0 Assuring liquidity of investment in the future.
" Redemption Rights e Preserve principal and providing downsides
" Right of Co-Sale protection to the investment.
" Conversion Rights 0 Keep the upside potentials of investment.
* Registration Rights
" Right of Participation
* Right of First Refusal
* Voting Rights * Having sufficient influence on the development
e Information Rights of the company.
" Protective Covenants e Having voting control to be able to replace
management in case of consistent bad
performance.
" Indemnification 0 Providing downsides protection to the
investment.
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2.5.2. Valuation Adjustment Mechanism
As mentioned above, private equity firms often find the financial information of Chinese
firms not reliable. Thus, private equity investors in China normally enter into a valuation
adjustment mechanism ("VAM") to protect themselves from earning surprises. The
following shows some commonly used mechanisms to provide investors with downsides
protection while maintaining upside potential.
2.5.2.1. Financial Measures / Earning Guarantee
If management fails to meet forecast targets, investors will receive more shares in the
company, or the management will give up board seats. The initial investment valuation is
normally based on the company achieving projected earnings, which is guaranteed in
the transaction documents. If the audited earnings are lower than the guaranteed
earning, then prevailing valuation would be adjusted by the following formula:
Adjusted Valuation = Valuation x Adjustment Factor
The Adjustment Factor is defined as the audited earnings divided by the guaranteed
earnings. For example, the investee company guarantees a net profit of $100 million in
2013 and achieved $80 million instead. The adjustment factor is $80/$100 = 0.8.
2.5.2.2. Non-financial Measures (e.g. license)
Depending on whether the target company can obtain new patents or licenses (e.g. in
mining industry), the investors will determine whether to launch the second round of
capital injection or to issue stock options to the management.
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Exit Guaran tee
If the target company cannot pay the cash dividends on time, they will be forced to pay
stock dividends. If the target company cannot achieve an IPO within a certain amount of
years, the investors can sell the stakes to a third party or require the management to buy
back their stake with accrued interest.
Case Study: Goldman Sachs and China Nepstar 5
In 2004, Goldman Sachs Private Equity Group ("PEG") invested $25 million via
convertible preferred shares in China Nepstar Chain Drugstore (NYSE: NPD), one of
China's largest retail drugstore chains. The 50 million Series A shares were bought at
$0.50 per share, at which PEG would own 30.3% of the company. The following is a
summary of the terms of the VAM in the Nepstar deal.
Measures Terms
If diluted EPS is less than 50 cents, or PEG can purchase a maximum of 15
EBITDA growth rate is less than 41.67% million convertible preferred shares at
by 2004 $0.0001 per share
Average revenue, EBIT and EBITDA in PEG is able to appoint new board
2005 is less than 70% of the guaranteed directors
number
Fails to obtain a qualified IPO by the Nepstar is required to buy back all PEG's
fourth anniversary of PEG's investment shares and pay the compounded annual
interest of 8% to PEG
Under the first financial measure, which is also known as an Earn-out Agreement,
Nepstar has to grow its earnings per share by $0.5, or EBITDA growth equivalent of
41.67%. If Nepstar fails to achieve the target, PEG would have the right to purchase 15
is Yong Kwek Ping, "Private Equity in China: Challenges and Opportunities", 2012
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million more shares for $1,500 (virtually free).
The second term is a non-financial measure known as a Workout Agreement. If the
company fails to achieve 70% of the 2005 guaranteed revenue, EBIT and EBITDA, PEG
can appoint additional board directors to the five-member board. The current board had
two members from PEG and three from Nepstar. By having this condition in place, PEG
was able to add another representative to the board, causing Nepstar's management to
lose the majority control of the company.
The above two terms show how PEG enforces discipline on the company to perform
over the next two years. Nepstar needed to achieve the guaranteed earnings in both
2004 and 2005: revenues grew by 21%, EBIT by 191%, and EBITDA by 113%. These
two terms aim to improve the company's profitability and push it to meet the listing
requirements of NYSE (the company suffers from a net loss in 2002 and 2003
consecutively). Although the terms seem tough, the founders accept it, as having
Goldman Sachs as a prestige investor helps when Nepstar gets listed on the NYSE.
The third term is about redemption. If Nepstar cannot get listed within four years after the
investment, the company has to buy back all of PEG's convertible preferred shares at
the cost plus an annual compounded interest rate of 8%. In addition, the company has to
achieve a pre-IPO valuation of no less than $250 million and net proceeds from listing of
no less than $50 million. If Nepstar achieves this, PEG would make a 3x investment
return.
As a result, the number of Nepstar's drugstores grew from 437 in 2004 to 2,002 stores in
2007. The company tumed a net loss of RMB18 million into a net profit of RMB13.6
million in 2006 and RMB148 million in 2007, which far exceeded the guaranteed net
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2.5.3. VIE Structure
As discussed in Section 2.1.1, foreign capital is prohibited from investing in certain
sectors in China, such as defense, telecommunications, education, internet, media, etc.
Also, USD-denominated funds are required to receive approvals from the Chinese
government before making an investment in the companies incorporated in mainland
China, which is time-consuming. To circumvent the regulations, VIE structures ("Variable
Interest Entity") are typically adopted by the Chinese companies to receive investments
from the USD-denominated funds and eventually get listed on an offshore stock
exchange.
Unlike a straight-forward equity acquisition, in a VIE structure, the offshore holding
company would form a new wholly owned subsidiary - Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise
("WFOE"), which would control and receive the economic benefits of the domestic
company (the VIE) through a series of contractual arrangements. The shareholders of
VIE, normally the majority shareholders in mainland China, would hold those licenses
and assets that cannot be legally owned by the WFOE under the foreign investment
restrictions in China.
42
profit of RMB100 million in 2007. Although Nepstar missed the guaranteed revenue, it
met the rest of the targets and achieved an IPO in 2007. This is a successful case of
VAM that helped to improve the business performance and achieve a win-win situation
for the portfolio company and the private equity investor.
The following shows a typical VIE structure. The contractual agreements"6 between the
WOFE and VIE consist of Exclusive Services Agreement' 7, Asset Licensing Agreement",
Voting Rights Agreement' 9 , and Loan Agreement 20 . These contractual agreements
effectively give the WOFE the full control and economic benefits over the operating
company in mainland China. The holding company then goes public on an overseas
exchange. This arrangement allows the foreign investors to bypass the regulatory
approval and filing requirement under the M&A Rules in mainland China. As of April
2011, 42% of Chinese companies listed in the U.S. have used the VIE structure and
thousands of private companies have adopted the VIE structure21
1 David Roberts and Thomas Hall, "VIE Structure in China: What You Need to Know", October, 2011
1 Under the agreement, the WFOE provides certain services to the VIE for a fee, typically determined by the
WFOE with the intended result of shifting the VIE's operating profits to the WFOE. The scope of service
t pically includes consulting and technical services
Under the agreement, the WFOE licenses certain assets, typically including intellectual property, to VIE
for royalty fees. The agreement usually allows the WFOE to terminate the license at any time. Such right of
termination gives the WFOE additional control over the VIE
19 Under the agreement, the VIE shareholders delegate their shareholder rights, including voting rights,
inspection/information rights, signing rights, and election rights, to the designee of the WFOE
20 The agreement grants a loan to the VIE shareholders to use for capitalization of the VIE. The agreement
includes covenants, limits on repayment methods and acceleration clauses designed to help in enforcing the
VIE structure as a whole
21 Yong Kwek Ping, "Private Equity in China: Challenges and Opportunities", 2012
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Source: David Roberts and Thomas Hall, "VIE Structure in China: What You Need to Know" October, 2011
This type of structure normally has offshore vehicles in the Cayman Islands or British
Virgin Islands due to their favorable tax rates, stronger legal protection, easer equity
transfer, and the ability to exit on an overseas stock exchange such as the NASDAQ or
SEHK.
In the early 2000s, the VIE structure was used mainly by the companies in some
restricted industries for foreign investments. With more companies adopting the VIE
structure getting listed in overseas stock exchanges, investors gradually got comfortable
with the VIE structure. Increasingly Chinese companies have adopted the structure,
including companies in traditional and asset-heavy industries. Currently, this issue is
getting the regulators' attention; and the regulatory scrutiny of the VIE structure is
increasing.
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The VIE structure is playing a critical role in the development of China's private sector.
Billions of dollars have been invested in China in this way. Taking into account the weak
legal system and enforceability of contracts in China, VIEs actually contain substantial
legal risks. The key question here is how secure the contractual agreements can protect
the foreign investor's rights and control on the operating company in mainland China.
Case Study: The Dispute between Yahoo! and Alibaba 2
In 2005, Yahoo! made what turned out to be a highly profitable investment in Alibaba
Group ("Alibaba"), the leading e-commerce platform in China. However, their
relationship got sour afterwards. In 2011, Alibaba transferred the ownership of Alipay, an
online payment service with a valuation of about $5 billion, to a firm owned by Mr. Jack
Ma, the founder and Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of Alibaba. The move eroded
Yahoo!'s 43% stake in Alibaba. Yahoo! claimed that it was not notified of the transfer
before the deal. Moreover, Yahoo! said that the management of Alibaba transferred
Alipay without the approval from the board. Mr. Ma claimed that to receive the permit of
a payment business in mainland China, Alipay has to be owned by an entity
incorporated in mainland China. However, the People's Bank of China (the central bank
of China) never publicly has confirmed his claim.
Alibaba's transfer of Alipay was done through the VIE structure. Although the dispute
has been settled after months of negotiation, the fact that the CEO of Alibaba was able
to transfer a $5 billion asset to his own company without getting the consent from the
major shareholders revealed the risk of the VIE structure.
22 Yong Kwek Ping, "Private Equity in China: Challenges and Opportunities", 2012
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2.6. Portfolio Management
Portfolio management is very important for growth equity investments in China. The
private equity sector is very competitive in China as there is lots of "hot money." The
value added by private equity firms becomes a crucial factor for the investee company to
select investors. The following shows some of the value added by private equity firms in
growth equity deals.
* Correction of issues discovered by due diligence: To improve the financial
reporting system and making sure the accuracy of the accounting numbers, to
standardize the day-to-day legal documents and reporting procedures, and to fix
loopholes in contracts, employment agreements, licensing agreements, etc.
These procedures are very important if the company aims to get listed in the
future.
* Active involvement in developing the portfolio company To provide M&A
advisory to the target company, to help recruit senior management such as the
CEO and the CFO, to cut down cost and improve operation efficiency, to help
bring more clients, to improve corporate government, and so on.
Case Study: TPG China and Daphne International23
In 2009, TPG invested into Daphne International, a producer and retailer of fashion
shoes for women. The company went public on the Main Board of SEHK in 1995. By the
end of 2008, Daphne has over 3,500 stores in mainland China with a revenue of over
$682 million.
TPG's investment consisted of unsecured convertible bonds due in 2014 with an
2 Victoria Ivashina, "TPG China: Daphne International", October 25, 2012
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aggregate principal amount of RMB550 million (about $81 million). As part of the
investment, TPG received the right to nominate one board director and one board
observer. TPG also received a right to nominate the candidates for CFO and the head of
supply chain management.
The cash that TPG invested in Daphne was not the sole reason of the investment as the
CEO comments: "money was not an issue. There is plenty of money in China." In fact,
Daphne was a cash rich company. The main attraction of the investment by TPG to
Daphne was that TPG was uniquely positioned to implement operational improvements
and to revamp the supply chain.
The new business model proposed by TPG was to adapt the production process to
better understand and respond to consumer preferences. It was building on a "fast-
fashion" model pioneered by Zara in the 1980s and successfully replicated by other
retailers such as H&M and the American Forever 21. Zara operated as a vertically
integrated apparel retailer, a business model that enabled it to offer trendy items
manufactured quickly and at affordable prices while to keep a low inventory. The
merchandise was supplied in small orders and quickly replenished. The new business
model designed by TPG was expected to improve the operation of Daphne in the
following aspects.
* New Merchandising Strategy
The strategy aims to compress the production cycle and to replace the seasonal full
production cycle with the initial-order production with a 40% reduction in the old
production amount. The new model is able to follow the fashion trend more closely; and
initial orders would be made much closer to the season launch. Also, a reliable, real-time
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sales database will be built to reflect the order fulfillment process, so that Daphne would
place few re-orders in the first weeks of a season.
* Improved R&D
While the previous SKUs ("stock-keeping units") selected for production were essentially
the replicas of top international brands modified by Daphne's suppliers, the new
business model requires having an internal, high-caliber designer team focusing on
fashion trends and brand positioning.
* Supply Chain Management
This strategy aims to compress manufacturing time from over 90 days to less than 30
days to allow for rapid replenishment of merchandise. Also, it helps to shorten the time
for re-ordered SKU to arrival at stores within 6 weeks, about a third of the previous re-
order time of 18 weeks. Moreover, the strategy will abandon large batch orders, which
would increase per unit cost and reduce current capacity utilization, but optimize logistics
for speed and flexibility of the manufacturing process. In addition, the strategy replaces
the current (mostly manual) processing with an automated and integrated IT platform
with high data capability.
. Inventory, Stock-outs, Sales mix
This initiative helps reduce inventory days to less than 120 days, shift inventory mix to
mainly comprise of top selling styles without much discount. It also remodels the
inventory system to ensure adequate supply of the top best-selling SKUs that
contributes 65% revenue and over 90% of profits. In the old model, the top styles almost
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sold out in the first few weeks
* Labor Management
Through the training of senior and junior store managers and better allocating sales
staffing during peak hours and non-peak hours, the new model is expected to reduce the
number of employees per store while improving sales.
0 Forecasting Model
The strategy helps build the forecasting model that takes into account the factors
influencing customer demands, including:
- Price sensitivity of the demand through the season
- Regional differences
- Impact from holidays
- Other factors such as fashion trends and extreme weather conditions
The new business model introduced by TPG brought several visible areas of
improvement. In 2010, Daphne's sales grew by 14% year-over-year. Aged inventory
reduced to an all-time low of 19% at the end of 2010. Average inventory turnover was
128 days, as compared to 156 in 2009 and 171 in 2008. The gross profit margin of
Daphne increased from 52.7% in 2008 to 61.1% in 2011; EBIT margin increased from
12.9% in 2008 to 15.4% in 2011. TPG, despite a minority shareholder, successfully
improved the business operation of Daphne.
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2.7. Exit Strategies
2.7.1. Current IPO Market for Chinese Companies
Possible exit mechanisms include IPOs, trading sales, buy-back arrangements, cash
distributions, asset swaps, distributions in kind, and liquidation. In the past, private equity
firms exit their portfolio companies mainly through an IPO. It is estimated that about 90%
of exits in Chinese investments are made through IPOs24.
The most acute need for exit will be investments made before 2008. But many private
equity firms are still adopting the strategy of "wait and see", hoping that that Hong
Kong's once-vibrant IPO market for Chinese companies will return to the old days soon.
However, the IPO flood of Chinese firms in Hong Kong almost came to a halt in 2012.
The U.S. stock market is expected to remain pessimistic about Chinese companies for a
long time due to accounting scandals happened in recent years. IPO through A-share
market in mainland China is now suspended with an approval backlog estimated to take
three to five years to clear 25 . To make things worse, China Securities Regulatory
Commission ("CSRC") has suspended the IPOs in A-share market at the beginning of
2013. As of May 1, 2013, there are still no IPOs. CSRC further announced that they
have no time schedule to re-launch IPOs in 2013.
Partly because of the bearish IPO market, the total value of China's private-equity deals
decreased by 27% to $21.9 billion in 2012, with only 473 transactions, the lowest level
since 2005. Private equity funds in China are still holding 82% of the companies they
have invested in since 2007. Blackstone Group LP, one of the world's biggest private-
equity firms, hasn't made a single investment in China outside the property sector since
24 Victoria Ivashina, TPG China: Daphne International
2 China First Capital, "China Private Equity Secondaries", January 16, 2013,
http://www.chinafirstcapital.com/blog/archives/4994
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2011. Mr. Antony Leung, Blackstone's chairman for Greater China, said that
"conservative sometimes may not be a bad thing"2 .
As such, the real challenge for private equity in China is to achieve more trade sales and
secondary sales.
2.7.2. Secondary Sales
Compared with the developed markets, the secondary sales market in China is less
active. Compared to IPOs, this type of exit historically generated a lower valuation in
China (as discussed in 2.3.6). Therefore, investors prefer to invest directly in a company
than to buy it from peers. In 2013, the IPO markets are all but shut down for Chinese
companies. However, many Chinese private companies are still seeking prices dating
back in 2007 when the listed firms traded in A-share markets at an average P/E multiple
of 30x-40x. Compared with the developed markets, entrepreneurs in China are less
experienced with the capital market. They are not accepting the valuation discount even
as the number of private-equity deals in China fell an unprecedented 43% and domestic
IPOs tumbled 70% in 201227
In the current difficult situation, secondary transactions provide a valuable exit solution.
The need for the diversification of exit becomes urgent. Many private equity firms that
wisely invested across a range of industries, vintage years and deal sizes, have become
overly relying on one single path to exit - IPO. There is another good potential exit for
26 Cathy Chan, "China Private Equity Chilled by 'old Days' Asking Prices", Bloomberg, Feb 5, 2013
27 Cathy Chan, "China Private Equity Chilled by 'old Days' Asking Prices", Bloomberg, Feb 5, 2013
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both deal sellers and buyers - "Quality Secondaries", which is a group of private equity
invested companies that fulfill four criteria 28:
* Not in IPO approval process, domestically or internationally
* Strong growth (+25% a year) since the original round of private equity investment,
and will continue to grow and potentially to achieve an IPO or trade sale exit in 3-
6 years
* Sound business from legal and regulatory perspective, have effective corporate
governance, with a majority of shareholders supportive for the secondary sales
* The current private equity investors seek secondary exit due to fund life or
portfolio management reasons
The following shows the number of unexited deals in China since 2001. The total
number of private equity deals that are not exited is about 7,500. China First Capital29
estimated that there are at least 200 companies that meet with the criteria of Quality
Secondaries.
28 China First Capital, "China Secondaries, The Necessary & Attractive Exit For Private Equity Deals in
China", 2013
2 China First Capital is a leading China-focused investment bank and advisory firm for private capital
markets and M&A transactions in China
52
China Private Equity Since 2001 (USD mn) Number of Closed Deals
2000
40000
30000
1200
20000
a Exied Unexted a Exited Unexited
Source: China First Capital, "China Secondaries, The Necessary & Attractive Exit For Private Equity Deals
in China" 2013
The number of Quality Secondaries is expected to grow by about 15%-25% per year, as
more funds are reaching the later stage of their lives, and other exit options remain
somewhat limited. Compared to the primary deals, the due diligence risk of Quality
Secondaries is significantly lower, and contingent risks (opportunity costs and legal risks
of pursuing other non-IPO exits) are lower as well. Therefore, secondary transactions
are estimated to grow from the current low level to a meaningful share of all private
equity exits in China.
China First Capital estimated that the RMB-denominated funds and the second tier
private equity funds will be the major net sellers to the secondary market. Top tier private
equity firms are likely to be net buyers. The industry is expecting a consolidation.
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Chapter 3: Look Forward- LBO Opportunities in China
A LBO deal employs financial leverage to acquire a company. LBOs allow private equity
firms to make large acquisitions without having to commit a lot of equity capital. Private
equity firms' return is partially from high leverage. Debt financing in a LBO is typically a
combination of bank loans (the majority), high-yield bonds/notes, mezzanine debt, and
asset-backed securitiesao. LBO deals in the U.S. and Europe often involves 60%-80% of
debt financing. Debt financing is crucial for the LBO deals.
Capital markets are divided into equity markets and debt markets. Currently in China,
the equity market is developing very fast; while the debt market is relatively under-
developed. Bank loans are the primary source of debt financing for corporates in China.
Commercial banks are playing a crucial role as a lender in the loan market and as an
investor in the debt market. Bank loans account for over 80% of the funding for non-
financial companies; while the remaining 20% are enterprise bonds, treasury bonds, and
equity financing (excluding IPOs)31 .
In the following sections, we will assess the potentials of LBO investments in China
through analyzing the capital market landscape of the country and case studies.
3.1. Acquisition Financing Provided by Banks in China
3.1.1. Policy Overview
In December 2008, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (the "CBRC") issued a
guideline that removes the long-standing restriction on the granting of bank loans for
equity investments in China. The Guidelines for the Risk Management of Merger and
Acquisition Loans Granted by Commercial Banks (the "Guideline") permits commercial
30 Paul A. Gompers, "Introduction to Private Equity Finance", August 17, 2012
31 Yong Kwek Ping, "Private Equity in China: Challenges and Opportunities", 2012
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banks incorporated in mainland China to make loans to domestic enterprises to conduct
both onshore and offshore M&A activities. The Guideline replacing the prohibition set out
in the "General Principles of Loans" by CBRC issued in 1996, prevented the banks in
mainland China from providing loans to domestic borrowers for the purpose of M&A
investments32.
. Onshore acquisitions: both domestic and wholly foreign-owned enterprises now
have access to alternative sources of funding for both equity and asset
acquisitions. Before the issuance of the Guideline, Chinese companies have had
to go through the cumbersome registration of capital increase process to get the
limited offshore funding to finance their onshore acquisitions
e Offshore acquisitions: the Guideline provided private domestic companies an
alternative source of funding from the major policy banks33. Before the issuance
of the Guideline, most of China's offshore M&A activities are undertaken by the
SOEs which are able to obtain preferential funding from the policy banks.
However, though the Guideline brings deregulation to the Chinese regulatory
environment by allowing banks to provide acquisition financing to domestic enterprises,
it remains vague how the Guideline can be practiced. The following shows some major
restrictive clauses of the Guideline relevant to LBO investments.
* Borrower qualifications: Acquisition financing can only be undertaken by
"domestic enterprises", including companies owned by Chinese nationals, Sino-
32 Norton Rose, "The Foundations for LBOs in China - Note on new Chinese M&A acquisition finance rules",
March 2009
3 There are three "policy" banks in China: the Agricultural Development Bank of China, China Development
Bank, and the Export-Import Bank of China. They were established in 1994 to take over the government-
directed spending functions of the four major state-owned commercial banks. These banks are responsible
for financing economic and trade development and state-invested projects. Agricultural Development Bank
of China provides funds for agricultural development projects in rural areas; China Development Bank
specializes in infrastructure financing, and Export-Import Bank of China specializes in trade financing.
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foreign joint ventures, and WFOEs. In this regard, RMB-denominated funds in
China appear to be allowed to leverage investments in China. However, it
remains to be tested in practice how other foreign "enterprises" (such as foreign
invested holding companies and USD-denominated private equity funds in China)
could benefit from the Guideline".
. Strategic relevance: when assessing any given M&A transaction, the lenders
must consider the "industry relevance", "strategic relevance" and any potential
synergy between the acquirer and the target. An acquirer must be able to
improve its core competitiveness through the proposed transaction by acquiring
strategic resources like R&D capability, key technology, trademarks, royalty
rights, supply and distribution networks. Though commercial banks are allowed
to offer acquisition financing services, the CBRC will still keep a strong control on
the acquisition finance deals in China.
" Term of loans, leverage ratio, and provisions: the term of the acquisition loan
is limited to 5 years; and the total value of a loan must not exceed 50% of the
total acquisition price. Also, specific provisions are required to be included in
M&A loan documentation, such as stringent securities to support the loan (by
ways of mortgages, pledges and the third party guarantees), financial covenants,
mandatory prepayment, change of control, restrictions on asset disposal, etc.
3.1.2. The Development of the Bank Acquisition Financing in PRC
In February 2009, Aluminum Corporation of China ("Chinalco") and Alcoa Inc jointly
acquired 12% of Rio Tinto Plc with a total investment of $14.05 billion. China
Development Bank (a policy bank in China) provided the acquisition financing to
34 King&Wood Mallesons, "New acquisition finance rule to boost Chinese M&A market", December 15, 2008,
http://www.mallesons.corm/publications/marketAlerts/2008/Documents/9734385w. htm
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Chinalco. This is the first bank acquisition financing deal in China. In November 2010,
the Bank of Beijing, the Bank of China (the "BOC") and the China Construction Bank
(the "CCB") together provided a RMB3.5 billion acquisition loan to Beijing State-Owned
Capital Management Center ( to acquire 45% of China
Securities Co. Ltd., which is one of the largest banking acquisition financing deals in
Chinese history.
The major challenges faced by banks when providing acquisition loans are as follows:
. The valuation of M&A deals and the amount of loan to be provided
" The risk management and the prevention of non-performing loans
The following shows the major bank acquisition financing deals since the issuance of the
Guidance.
Date Sponsor Deal Size Sponsor Acquirer
Background Background
01/09 China CITIC Group and RMB1,630M Policy bank SOE
Development CITIC Guoan to
Bank acquire Silver
Group
02/09 Industrial Brilliance Group RMB400M State-owned SOE
Commercial to acquire SIIC commercial
Bank of Business bank
China
("ICBC")
03/09 CCB, Bank of Bao Steel to RMB1,550M State-owned SOE
Communi- Acquire Ningbo commercial
cations Steel bank
03/09 BOC Huaneng Group RMB680M State-owned SOE
commercial
bank
03/09 BOC, Bank of China National RMB850M State-owned SOE
Beijing, Citic Machinery commercial
Bank Industry Corp. to bank
increase %
shares in YTO
Group Corp.
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03/09 Industrial Huayuan RMB600M Joint stock Sino-Foreign
Bank Co. Property commercial joint venture
LTD bank
09/09 Agricultural China Materials RMB198M State-owned SOE
Bank of Development commercial
China Investment Co. bank
07/10 BOC Henan Coal RMB385M State-owned SOE
Chemical Group commercial
bank
11/10 Bank of Beijing State- RMB3,500M State-owned SOE
Beijing, BOC, Owned Capital bank
CCO Management
Center to acquire
45% of China
Securities Co.
06/11 China Chongqing E35M Policy bank SOE
Development Textile Group to
Bank acquire
SaarGummi
Group
06/11 Agricultural Guodian RMB294 M State-owned SOE
Bank of Yongshou Coal bank
China integration LLC
Source: China Venture, "Future of Banking Acquisition Rnancing in China" August 2011,
http://report.chinaventure.com.cn/r/f/405.aspx
The following shows some common practices of bank acquisition loans in China.
Industries Encouraged Non-ferrous metal, steel, automobile, ship-building, petro-
by Government to chemical, textile, logistics and transportation, heavy
Conduct M&A machinery manufacturing, news media, pharmaceutical
retailing
Term 3-5 years
Interests Similar to the rate of the ordinary commercial loans
Collateral I Guarantee Higher than that of the ordinary commercial loans, including
pledge of assets and equity, third-party assurance, etc.
Management of At least 3 years of M&A experience
Acquirer(s)
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Deal Selection Provincial bank branches source deals and then report to
head office
Source: China Venture, "Future of Banking Acquisition Financing in China" August 2011,
http://report.chinaventure.com.cn/r/f/405.aspx
From the above information, we can see that most of the financial sponsors are policy
banks and state-owned banks, while the acquirers are SOEs. The bank loan policies in
China still tilt towards SOEs. There is a long way to go for privately owned companies to
get access to the banking acquisition loans. Also, from the above list, we can see that all
of the loans are provided to strategic investors (mainly SOEs) to conduct onshore and
offshore M&As. Moreover, banks will give priority to industries and companies that are
supported by the Chinese government to conduct M&As, such as steel and automobile
industries. Therefore, the chance of a LBO financing provided by Chinese banks to
private equity firms is limited in the near future.
However, the successful deals conducted in the recent years have established good
practices for the bank acquisition financing sector in China, helping banks to improve
their risk management system and to get prepared for providing financing to a variety of
acquirers in the long term.
The following shows a pioneer bank acquisition financing deal in mainland China. From
the case, we can see that Chinese banks are still very conservative in selecting deals.
Case Study: Bank Acquisition Financing for North China Pharmaceutical3 5
In 2009, China Citic Bank provided an acquisition loan of RMB60 million to North China
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. ("North China Pharmaceutical") to acquire 30% shares of
North China Pharmaceutical Peida Co. Ltd. ("Peida") owed by Sojitz Corporation and
3s China Citic Bank, "Case Study of North China Pharmaceutical Acquisition Financing", October, 2009
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Sojitz (China) Co., Ltd. respectively, so as to own 100% of the company.
On March 19, 2009, in order to introduce advanced technology and to expand
production, North China Pharmaceutical signed a strategic cooperation agreement and a
restructuring agreement with DSM (a Holland-based life and materials science
company). The two parties will set up three joint ventures that assume the equity and
liability from Peida, a subsidiary of North China Pharmaceutical. DSM will acquire 9.77%
shares of Peida at a price of RMB189 MM and become a new shareholder. Before
bringing on the new strategic investor, North China Pharmaceutical needs to acquire the
30% shares from the two existing shareholders of Peida - Sojitz Corporation and Sojitz
(China) Co., Ltd. - at a price of RMB122.7M.
The acquirer - North China Pharmaceutical is a SOE, listed in SHSE with a total revenue
of RMB4.9 billion ($) in 2008. The target company Peida is a joint venture among North
China Pharmaceutical (70%), Sojitz Corporation (15%), and Sojitz (China) Co. (15%),
with a revenue of RMB579 million in 2008. The following shows the transaction chart.
3, Consideration
2. Acquisition Loan Payment
Citic Bank North China ------------- Sojitz Corp.
1. Collateral Pharmaceutical 4. Equity transfer Sojitz (China)
5. Wholly owned entity
Peida
The following table shows some transaction details:
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No less than 30% shares of Peida.
Source of
Repayment
Investment
Thesis
" Plan A: Peida will sell its assets to the joint ventures established by
North China Pharmaceutical and DSM, and use the proceeds to
pay dividends to the parent company - North China Pharmaceutical.
The dividends received will be used to pay for the acquisition loan.
" Plan B: If Plan A fails, North China Pharmaceutical will use its
balance sheet cash to pay off the loan.
" Industry dynamics: The pharmaceutical industry is regarded a
"Sunrise Industry" in China, with an annual growth rate of 17.5% in
the past 20 years. Also, the Chinese government supports the
industry consolidation, which will help eliminate small players.
" The financial position of the acquirer: the acquirer is a leading SOE
in the pharmaceutical industry with a strong balance sheet and
sound profitability.
" M&A synergy: DSM is expected to bring advanced technology to
Peida and help increase its competitiveness.
Citic Bank believes that the major risk is the compliance legitimacy of
Potential
the transaction, as it is the first acquisition financing deal done by the
Risk
bank.
Source: Citic Bank
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Collateral
3.2. Bond Market in China
3.2.1. Market Overview
China's bond market is the fourth largest in the world at about RMB21.73 trillion ($3.41
trillion)6. However, compared to the developed countries like the U.S. where corporate
bonds consist of 50% of corporate financing37, bonds only account for 13% of corporate
financing in China, while the bank lending accounts for 82%". The bond market in China
is mainly made up of government bonds, central bank bills, financial bonds issued by
China's policy banks, and enterprise bonds issued by SOEs. The corporate bond market
for private companies consists of a very small portion of the total issuance outstanding
(about 2% in 2012).
There are two major bond markets in China:
* The Interbank Bond Market, mainly regulated by the People's Bank of China. The
transactions account for more than 95% of total outstanding bonds in mainland
China, reaching $35 trillion in 201239. It is an over-the-counter market, quote driven
and mainly made up of institutional investors.
" The Public Exchange Market, regulated by CSRC. Corporate bonds are mainly
traded here.
There are four major types of bonds traded in China's bond market":
* Government bonds: issued by the Ministry of Finance in a range of maturities to
finance government spending. It is the largest segment of the bond market in China.
3 Goldman Sachs Global Liquidity Management, "FAQ: China's Bond Market", 2013
3 Nils Hakansson, "The Role of a Corporate Bond Market in an Economy - and in Avoiding Crises" , 1999
38 Yong Kwek Ping, "Private Equity in China: Challenges and Opportunities", 2012
3 Goldman Sachs Global Liquidity Management, "FAQ: China's Bond Market", 2013
4 Goldman Sachs Global Liquidity Management, "FAQ: China's Bond Market", 2013
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As of December 2012, the size of government bonds is about RMB7.81 trillion ($1.25
trillion), consisting of about 30% of the total bond market. Local governments also
issue bonds, similar to the municipal bonds in the U.S.
" Central Bank notes: short-term securities issued by the Peoples Bank of China (the
Central Bank in China) as a tool to implement monetary policy. As of December 2012,
it is the second largest bond segment in mainland China with about RMB7.59 billion
($1.22 billion), consisting of 29% of total market size. Central bank notes are the
most actively traded sector in the bond market due to the large amount outstanding
and the regular weekly issuance (which is unique in China).
" Financial bonds: issued by policy banks, commercial banks and other financial
institutions. The policy banks, such as the China Development Bank and the Export-
Import Bank of China, are the largest issuers. Only policy bank bonds are backed by
the central government.
* Non-financial Corporate bonds: include a wide variety of bonds. The largest sector
is the Enterprise Bonds issued by the SOEs.
The following shows the size of various bond sectors in China as of December 2012.
8000 1-7,587 7,810
7000-
6000-
5000
4000
3000_ 2,908 2,402
2000 1,158 1,265
1000
Policy Bank Ministry of Central Bank Medium- Enterprise Commercial Local Corporate Others
Bonds Finance Bonds Notes Term Notes Bonds Paper Gov't Bonds Bonds
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Liquidity Management, "FAQ: China's Bond Market" 2013
Ministry of Finance, as of December 2012
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The following shows the instruments, participants, and regulatory bodies in China's
domestic bond market.
Interbank Bond Market Exchange Market
Instruments e Government bonds 0 Some central government
" Central Bank notes bonds
" Financial bonds e Some enterprise bonds
" Commercial paper e Corporate bonds
* Medium-term notes
" Enterprise bonds
Participants * Banks 0 Individual investors
" Insurance companies 0 Insurance companies
" Mutual funds e Mutual funds
* Security houses * Security houses
e Other institutional investors 0 Other institutional investors
excluding banks
Regulatory 0 People's Bank of China 0 China Security Regulatory
Body 0 National Association of Financial Commission
Market Institutional Investors
Source: Yong Kwek Ping, "Private Equity in China: Challenges and Opportunities" 2012
Currently, there are four major credit rating agencies in China. Similar to the credit
agencies in the U.S., they charge fees from the target entities being rated. The following
shows the relevant information of the four credit rating agencies.
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Credit Agency Background Information
China Cheng Xin International 49% owned by Moody's
Credit Rating Co. Ltd.
China Lianhe Credit Rating Co., Ltd. 49% owned by Fitch
Shanghai Brilliance Credit Rating & Strategic cooperation agreement with Standard &
Investors Service Co., Ltd. Poor's
Dagong Global Credit Rating Co. One of the few notable non-US based credit
Ltd. rating agencies. 60% owned by - Mr. Guang
Zhongjina, a Chinese national
3.2.2. Development of the Bond Market in China
Commercial banks dominate trading activities in China's inter-bank bond market,
accounting for about 70% of trading volume, as they have limited investment channels
and are restricted from investing in equities and the futures market. The trading activities
of China's bond market grow rapidly, reaching about $35 trillion in total trading volume in
201241. However, the majority are repo bonds issued by the People's Bank of China. The
following shows the bond trading volume and segment breakdown from 2000 to 2012.
- Repo
. Policy Bank Bond
Central Bank Note Government Bond
Other E Local Government Bond
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Liquidity Management, "FAQ: China's Bond Market" 2013
Wnd, as of December 2012
-I
4 Goldman Sachs Global Liquidity Management, "FAQ: China's Bond Market", 2013
65
40
3 0
-
-20 -
10
The debt market in China is strictly controlled. A majority of debt issuance requires
governmental approval and a large state-owned bank as guarantor. This limits the
access of private firms to issue debt. Therefore, private firms are forced to turn to bank
financing, which is controlled largely by state-owned banks and gives preference to
SOEs. There is a great urgency to diversify in corporate financing sources and to build a
strong debt market to reduce the dependence of corporates on state-owned banks for
financing. Also, a developed bond market will help to diversify investors' portfolio and to
improve corporate governance, since the valuation of bonds are highly dependent on the
external ratings by credit rating agencies, which increases the scrutiny on firms looking
for capital in the debt market.
Realizing the limits of an under-developed debt market, the Chinese government is
increasingly taking steps to diversify the bond market and introduce new products. The
following shows the milestones of China's bond market in recent years.
" Asset backed securities: In 2005, a pilot program to test the asset-backed
securities (the "ABS") was launched. In 2012, the new regulations announced by
CSRC expand the class of assets that can be securitized to include loans,
receivables, infrastructure dividends, commercial paper, stocks, bonds, and real
estate properties. Once the assets are securitized, the tradable securities can be
bought and sold on legally recognized exchanges 2 .
* Onshore RMB-denominated Panda Bonds: In 2005, a pilot program of Panda
Bonds was launched - allowing foreign corporations and financial institutions to raise
funds by issuing RMB-denominated bonds on the SHSE. Those funds could then be
42 Samuel Shen and Pete Sweeney, "China Supports Issuance of Asset-backed Securities", Reuters, Feb 26,
2013
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used to support domestic operations of the issuer, or to be converted into other
currencies and used for corporate purposes outside China".
. Offshore RMB-denominated Dim Sum Bonds: In 2007, China Development Bank
issued the first dim sum bond in Hong Kong - bonds denominated in RMB but issued
outside of mainland China. Dim Sum bonds are attractive to foreign investors who
want to get exposure to RMB-denominated assets, but are restricted by China's
capital controls on foreign investments in domestic debt markets. The issuers are
mainly entities based in mainland China and Hong Kong. The issuance of Dim Sum
bonds started strongly in 2013, with nearly RMB10 billion ($1.6 billion) of orders
chasing three dim sum bonds in January 2013, eventually raised a combined
RMB2.9 billion ($468 million). Issuance volume in 2013 is expected to increase by 20
- 30%, reaching about RMB320 billion".
* SME Private Placement Bonds: In June 2012, CSRC initiated the private
placement bond pilot projects for the SMEs in China, aiming to broaden the financing
channels for them. This will help meet the high market demand of high-yield bonds.
Regulatory permits will not be required for issuing the bonds, but the placement
agents should file relevant materials to the stock exchanges for record purpose. Due
to the lack of threshold requirements on issuers' net assets and profitability, SME
private placement bonds are fully market-oriented credit bonds.
The following is an overview of the major debt instruments issued by corporate issuers.
4 King & Wood Mallesons, "China Opens Door to Panda Bonds", May 11, 2005
4 Reuters, "Dim Sum Bond Market Shrugs Off China Worries", Jan 23, 2013
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Commercial Enterprise Corporate SME Private
paper ("CP")& Bonds Bonds Placement
Medium-term Bonds
notes ("MTN")
Regulator National National CSRC Securities
Association of Development Exchanges
Financial Market and Reform
Institutional Commission
Investors ("NDRC")
Regulatory Registration Regulatory Regulatory Registration
Mechanism approval approval
Eligible Nonfinancial Unlisted Listed Unlisted SMEs
Issuers companies companies companies (excl. financial &
real estate
sectors)
Issuance Public offering Public offering Public offering Private
Method placement
(within 200
investors)
Maximum Up to 40% of net Up to 40% of Up to 40% of net No limit
Issue Size assets net assets assets
Maturity CP: up to 1 year Medium/long Long term 1-3 years
MTN: 3-5 years term
Major Interbank Interbank Security Security
Markets market market, security exchange exchange
exchange
Source: Takeshi Jingu, "China's Growing Corporate Bond Issuance" November 12, 2012
China's domestic bond market is increasingly improving. The initiation of Dim Sum
Bonds, the pilot programs of Panda Bonds and the issuance of SME Private Placement
Bonds are creating a beneficial environment for the development of the high yield bond
market in China. However, these programs are still in the initial stage of development; a
large portion of issuers are large SOEs and policy banks in mainland China as well as
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big corporations in Hong Kong, which want to get financing from credit markets for self-
development purposes. So far, there is no LBO deal getting financed from the bond
market in China. There is a long way to go before a well-functioning high yield bond
market is developed in China.
3.3. LBO in Chinese Companies
The LBO deals with the Chinese companies as buyout targets are mainly companies
listed overseas. The equity financing are normally provided by international buy-out
funds such as the Carlyle Group and Baring Private Equity Asia Group; and debt
financing are mostly provided by multinational banks such as Citigroup, Bank of America,
and Credit Suisse. In the following section, we will take a close look at the emerging
LBOs in overseas listed Chinese Companies.
3.3.1. Challenges in Developing LBO Market in China
An important criteria for making successful LBO investments in China is to find a suitable
target - companies with stable cash flows, so that the investee companies are able to
pay off the big amount of interest and maximize their interest tax shields. However, in
China, the cash flow rich companies are mostly large SOEs or joint ventures with SOEs,
which are unlikely to go LBO. Also, as discussed above, the debt market in China is still
under-developed, making it more difficult for private equity firms to structure attractive
LBO deals in China. Moreover, the debt markets in mainland China have preferential
policies for SOEs, which makes it even harder for privately owned companies to be
acquired via LBO deals.
A lot of infrastructure needs to be developed before LBOs become common in mainland
China. Secured lending laws are still under-developed. Lenders cannot be granted a
perfect charge over all assets of a LBO target. Also, where a security interest can be
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taken, the enforcement process is often unclear or subject to the consents from local
government. Also, Chinese companies are not permitted to guarantee the debts of their
shareholders. Moreover, as most private equity funds in China are USD-denominated
funds (as discussed in Section 2.1), the private equity vehicle holding the debt are
mostly incorporated offshore and are isolated from the company holding the assets.
3.3.2. LBO Opportunities in Overseas Listed Chinese Companies
As of March 31, 2013, LBO investments in Chinese companies are mainly happening in
the overseas exchanges. A common concern among foreign investors in China is the
various sets of accounting books that Chinese companies notoriously own. In the recent
years, many Chinese companies listed in the U.S. get involved in the issues related to
accounting irregularities that led to a wave of suspensions and de-listing of their shares.
Moreover, several due diligence-based equity research firms are established with an aim
to discover the fraudulent accounting practices in Chinese companies. Their research
reports and the accounting scandals of some Chinese firms made foreign investors lose
confidence in Chinese companies. The short-selling from institutional investors drag
down the overall valuation of Chinese firms listed in the stock exchanges in the U.S.
Further study shows that a majority of the companies in accounting scandals have listed
their shares through reverse takeovers - a swap-share transaction with a listed shell -
which would bypass a security regulator's scrutiny as compared to a front-door IPO.
Chinese firms listed in the U.S. through IPO still have sound accounting quality. Also,
most arguments in the research papers questioning the accounting irregularities of the
Chinese companies are based on assumptions and logic deduction instead of facts.
These research papers are not always true. Realizing this, many private equity investors
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saw the potential buyout opportunities and started to help privatize the undervalued
Chinese companies.
However, the selection of the LBO targets is still an issue. Non-SOEs in China are
mostly small in market capitalization. The bigger companies listed overseas are largely
in the technology sector, especially new media and clean tech, which may not be
attractive buyout candidates due to their volatile cash flows as well as cyclical and asset-
light businesses. Another major challenge for this type of deals is the offshore holdco
structure (the VIE structure) that receives financing. As discussed in the Section 2.5.3,
for the cross-border financing by Chinese companies, the offshore holdco structure is a
major risk for potential lenders to repatriate dividends from the onshore operating
company, which is the only way to service the LBO debt.
Case Study A: Harbin Electric Going Private: Chinese LBO Pioneer 4 5 4 6
On June 20, 2011, the board of Harbin Electric ("Harbin", NASDAQ: HRBN), a China-
based manufacturer of electric motors (linear motors, micro motors, and rotary motors)
used in a range of applications from mail sorting machines to automobile seats, agreed
to sell the company to a group including its chairman and CEO, for $24 per share.
Shares rose 59% with a closing price of $13.35 on June 20, 2011. Harbin Electric
became a public company in 2005 after completing a reverse merger47.
The acquisition is funded by loans from the China Development Bank and Abax Global
Capital Ltd ("Abax"), the manager of a $900 million private equity fund backed by
Morgan Stanley. Chairman and CEO, Mr. Tianfu Yang and Abax were Harbin's two
4s Belinda Cao, "China's Harbin Electric Jumps on Buyout Offer", Bloomberg, June 20, 2011
4 Tim Burroughs, "Harbin Electric shareholders approve MBO", Asian Venture Capital Journal, Nov 1, 2011
47 Chinese companies go public in the U.S. using a backdoor listing strategy by which they buy a public shell
company and assume its ticker
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biggest shareholders. Yang owned 40.7%, while Abax held a 5.4% stake.
Tech Full Electric, a Cayman Islands-based company controlled by Mr. Yang, purchased
all the Harbin stock that he and Abax had not already owned, for about $463.8 million in
total. The transaction was funded through a $400 million acquisition loan from the Hong
Kong branch of China Development Bank, $38.8 million in equity financing and $25
million in short-term debt from Abax. Abax remains a minority shareholder of the
company.
The $750 million deal for Harbin came just a week after the company's stock price
plummeted as a result of a report from the short-seller Citron Research ", which
questioned Harbin's financials. Before the announcement of the management buyout
deal, the shares of Harbin dropped below $6 from more than $15. Short-sale positions
were 14.7% of the company's total outstanding shares, compared with 7.7% at the
beginning of 2011. Following the buyout news, the share price jumped nearly 63% to
$13, but still significantly below the proposed takeover price, indicating that the investors
lacked confidence in an ability to close the LBO deal.
Mr. Mark Tobin, the co-director of research at Roth Capital Partners, pointed out that
events preventing the shares from reaching the $24 price target include "numerous
steps in the privatization process, some of which could lead to delays in completing the
transaction" and "a slowdown in China's economic growth, which could impact the
company's sales and margins".
On November 1, 2011, the deal went through and Harbin was taken private. Mr. Yang
said in a statement:" A significant amount of information that is false and misleading as
4 Citron is one of a few research firms aiming at reverse mergers that involve Chinese companies
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Case Study B: China's Biggest LBO in Focus Media49 5*
In December 2012, Focus Media Holding Ltd. ("Focus Media", NASDAQ: FMCN), a
Chinese advertising company, agreed to be bought by a consortium of investors led by
the Carlyle Group ("Carlyle") in a $3.7 billion deal, which would be the country's largest
LBO deal. The buyout group (the "Group") also includes CEO Jason Nanchun Jiang and
the private equity funds - FountainVest Partners, Citic Capital Partners and China
49 Ye Xie, Victoria Stilwell, "Focus Media Makes Deal in Biggest China Leveraged Buyout", Bloomberg,
December 19, 2012
s Prudence Ho, "A Fresh Push for LBOs in Asia", The Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2013
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well as defamatory has been introduced into the market, and has clearly affected market
trading of the company's stock."
The following shows the stock price chart of Harbin from April 5th to November 1st 2011
(the last trading day).
04/05/11 +C 04/05/12 f 6 + Embed chart
32.84
Source: http:/www'wikinvest.com/
Everbright Ltd. (SEHK: 165). The transaction is expected to be closed by the second
quarter in 2013.
Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, UBS, China Development Bank, ICBC and China
Minsheng Bank joined the three original banks on the deal - Citigroup, Credit Suisse
Group, and DBS Bank - to provide syndicated financing for the buyout deal. The
financing size is US$1 .525 billion, made up of a cash bridge loan, a long-term loan, and
a high-yield bond. The size of the loan-term loan has been increased to $1 billion from
about $700 million. The nine banks are selling $1.08 billion in smaller chunks to other
banks.
The board of Focus Media has approved the offer from the Group to acquire the
company for $27.50 per American depositary share. The price was $0.50 more than the
Group offered in a non-binding proposal in August 2012. The shares jumped 6.7% to
$25.52 after the board accepted the deal, the highest close since April 12. Mr. Jiang, the
management and Fosun International Ltd. (SEHK: 656), which together held 36%
shares, have voted in favor of the deal.
Focus Media, founded in 2003, went IPO on the NASDAQ Stock Market in July 2005.
After accused by the short-seller Muddy Waters LLC51 of overstating the number of
screens used to display advertisements in China, the company joined an increasing
number of Chinese companies seeking to withdraw from the U.S. exchanges, as the
corporate governance concern from the public depressed their stock valuations. Since
April 2010, 19 of the 49 companies that announced an intention to go private have
completed the transactions, while four failed, according to a report by Roth Capital
si A due diligence-based equity research firm with a focus on Chinese companies
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Partners on November 5, 2012.
A major challenge for this deal is Focus Media's lack of hard assets in the underlying
business. The deal shows that private equity firms are targeting opportunities in
overseas-listed Chinese stocks after a series of corporate governance scandals eroded
investors' confidence and slashed the valuations. The financial sponsors of the deal
indicated that a re-listing may eventually happen - possibly in Asia.
The following charts show the stock price and trading volume of Focus Media from May
9 th 2012 to May 8 th 2013.
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Source: Capital IQ
On Feb 28, 2013, the Chinese budget hotel chain 7 Days Group ("7 Days") has
accepted a take-private offer from a consortium led by the Carlyle Group ("Carlyle") and
7 Days' co-chairmen Boquan He and Nanyan Zheng, which values the company at
about $688 million. The deal is expected to be closed by the end of the third quarter in
2013.
Under the terms of the deal, Carlyle will issue cash payments of $13.8 per American
Depository Share, a 30.6% premium to the last closing day price before the submission
of the offer on September 25, 2012. The transaction will be financed through a
combination of cash contributions from Carlyle, Sequoia, Actis and Mr. He, as well as a
$120 million loan facility provided by Cathay United Bank, Chinatrust Commercial Bank,
Nomura International, Ta Chong Bank and Taipei Fubon Commercial Bank. Once the
deal has been completed, 7 Days stock will cease to be traded as a public company and
become a majority owned subsidiary of Carlyle.
The following charts show the stock price and trading volume of 7 Days from May 9 1h
2012 to May 8th 2013.
s2 Stephen Aldred, "Carlyle-led consortium agrees to buy 7 Days for $688 million", Reuters, February 28,
2013
s3 Tim Burroughs, "7 Days board agrees to PE-backed buyout", Asian Venture Capital Journal, March 1,
2013
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As discussed above, funding for LBO deals in Chinese companies is mainly provided
through offshore holding companies, which makes most banks skeptical about the
repayment of loans. The resulting limited loan financing has restricted the deal size of
LBOs in Chinese companies and increased the amount of equity that private equity firms
have to invest.
However, as Mr. Brett King, a partner at Paul, Hastings, Janofsky and Walker in Hong
Kong, said: "There's not a large amount of leverage in offshore vehicles for PRC buyouts,
leading to typical debt-to-equity ratios of 0.75x/1lx, compared to 3x/5x in Korea, 3x/4.5x
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in Hong Kong and 5x/6x in Europe. Nevertheless, now that high-yield debt can be issued
in all Asian jurisdictions, it makes leveraged buyouts far more attractive.""
The following shows a credit statistics comparison between the large corporate LBO
deals in the U.S. from Q1 2011 to Q3 2012 and the recent LBO deals in overseas-listed
Chinese firms since 2011. From the following table, we can see that on average, the
LBOs in Chinese companies has a lower leverage ratio, higher equity contribution,
higher bank debt portion (secured debt), no high yield bond financing, and a relatively
simpler capital structure than those in the U.S.
LBO deals in U.S. Harbin Focus 7 Days
(Q111-Q3112) Electric Media
Debt-to-EBITDA
Multiple 4.6x-5.8x 4.1x 5.24x 1.3x
Average Equity 33%-45% (long
Contribution term average: 37%) 43% 59% 83%
Price Multiples 7.8x-9.8x 7.3x 10.4x 7.4x
Price Premium 28.1% (since 1980) 185% 17.6% 30.6%
Debt/Asset
before LBO 25% 21% 12% 13%
30-50% (5-8 years 53% (5-years
% Bank Debt maturity) maturity) 41% 17%
High-Yield Bond
Source: Steve Miller, "LBO
9, 2012
S&P Capital IQ LC
S&P Capital IQ Co
20-30% (7-10 years No high-yield No high-
maturity) bond yield bond
Credit Stats: Leverage, Purchase Multiples Rise As Yields Fall",
D
m7panies
No high-
yield bond
Forbes, October,
5 Simon Osborne, "LBOs to Join Growth Deals in Chinese Private Equity", AsianInvestor, June 2006
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The following shows a comparison of some general credit statistics in the U.S. and
China since 2011.
The U.S. China
Yield of 6% -8% 6.5% - 8.5% (similar as the
Leveraged ordinary commercial loan as
Loan investment targets are mainly
large SOEs with sound financial
position)
Yield of High- 8% - 11% 9.5-13.5%
Yield Bonds
LBOs by Type During Q3 2012: Mainly Public-to-private deals
* Sponsor to sponsor 61%
* Public-to-private: 17%
e Corporate divestiture: 12%
* Others: 10%
During Q3 2011:
" Sponsor to sponsor 22%
e Public-to-private: 45%
* Corporate divestiture: 18%
* Others: 15%
Source: Steve AIller, "LBO Credit Stats: Leverage, Purchase Multiples Rise As Yields Fall" Forbes, October,
9, 2012
S&P Capital IQ LCD
Hexun Bond, http://bond.hexun.com/
LBO is a common type of private equity investment in the developed markets. However,
it is still in the initial stages of development in China. To develop a functional LBO
market in China, the top-down policy changes are recommended:
e To give more flexibility to the banks in providing acquisition financing and
syndicated loans for M&As.
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* To further develop the debt market and allow more issuance of corporate bonds
by private companies.
" To loosen up the convertibility of the RMB.
* To abandon the restriction on capital inflows and outflows from the country.
The private equity landscape in China is gradually moving from growth equity
investments to buyout deals. With the development of China's debt market, more LBO
deals are expected to be executed.
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Appendix A - AH shares Valuation Comparison
H- VS.
H-shares A-shares A-shares
Price Price Premium
Name Symbol (HKD) Chg(%)i Symbol (RMB) Chg(%) (%)2
ANHUI CONCH 00914.HK 26.15 0.00 600585.SH 17.86 1.48 18.33
JIANGSU EXPRESS 00177.HK 7.69 -1.66 600377.SH 5.43 -0.18 14.45
CHINA COMM CONS 01800.HK 6.63 -0.60 601800.SH 4.71 -0.42 13.76
PING AN 02318.HK 60.4 -0.58 601318.SH 43.11 -0.12 13.23
CHINA RAIL CONS
CPIC
CHINA RAILWAY
TSINGTAO BREW
CITIC SEC
ANGANG STEEL
CCB
ABC
SH PHARMA
CSR
CHINA SHENHUA
GUANGSHEN RAIL
ICBC
CM BANK
CHINA LIFE
BANKCOMM
AIR CHINA
BANK OF CHINA
HUANENG POWER
ZTE
PETROCHINA
WEICHAI POWER
SINOPEC CORP
NCI
CHINA SOUTH AIR
FOSUN PHARMA
BYD COMPANY
ZOOMLION
01 186.HK
02601.HK
00390.HK
00168.HK
06030.HK
00347.HK
00939.HK
01288.HK
02607.HK
01766.HK
01088.HK
00525.HK
01398.HK
03968.HK
02628.HK
03328.HK
00753.HK
03988.HK
00902.HK
00763.HK
00857.HK
02338.HK
00386.HK
01336.HK
01055.HK
02196.HK
01211.HK
01157.HK
7.14
25.9
3.96
48.3
17.88
4.65
6.17
3.77
17.16
5.69
28.35
4.15
5.32
16.56
21.25
5.89
6.85
3.51
8.13
13.96
10.24
25.75
8.75
27.65
4.39
12.94
24.95
9.03
-0.97
-0.39
-0.75
0.73
-0.89
-2.11
-0.64
-1.05
0.23
0.53
-0.70
4.27
-0.38
-0.48
-0.93
-0.17
1.48
-0.57
2.39
-2.79
-1.35
-2.65
0.23
3.17
0.46
0.94
1.42
-2.90
601186.SH
601601.SH
601390.SH
600600.SH
600030.SH
000898.SZ
601939.SH
601288.SH
601607.SH
601766.SH
601088.SH
601333.SH
601398.SH
600036.SH
601628.SH
601328.SH
601111.SH
601988.SH
600011.SH
000063.SZ
601857.SH
000338.SZ
600028.SH
601336.SH
600029.SH
600196.SH
002594.SZ
000157.SZ
5.17
18.86
2.91
35.75
13.31
3.47
4.71
2.88
13.24
4.41
22.06
3.25
4.18
13.13
17.47
4.86
5.8
2.98
6.95
12.02
8.89
22.63
7.72
24.43
3.9
11.92
23.4
8.51
0.00
0.00
-0.34
-0.11
-1.19
-0.29
0.21
0.00
-0.15
-0.45
0.00
4.17
0.24
0.00
-1.08
0.00
0.69
0.00
0.43
-3.22
-0.45
-2.16
2.66
0.21
1.04
1.27
-0.43
-0.70
11.62
10.99
9.97
9.19
8.57
8.29
5.87
5.81
4.75
4.27
3.87
3.21
2.86
1.93
-1.69
-2.05
-4.54
-4.80
-5.45
-6.14
-6.91
-8.04
-8.40
-8.53
-9.03
-12.27
-13.83
-14.25
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GAC GROUP 02238.HK 6.34 1.77 601238.SH 6.08 -0.65 -15.73
MAANSHAN IRON 00323.HK 2.03 -0.49 600808.SH 1.97 -0.51 -16.74
CIMC 02039.HK 13.3 -1.34 000039.SZ 13.01 -0.91 -17.38
ANHUIEXPRESSWA 00995.HK 4.05 -2.41 600012.SH 4.04 0.00 -18.98
CHINA EAST AIR 00670.HK 3.42 -1.44 600115.SH 3.45 0.29 -19.89
HAITONG SEC 06837.HK 11.34 -1.05 600837.SH 11.48 -0.78 -20.16
DONGFANG ELEC 01072.HK 14.6 -1.48 600875.SH 15.1 -0.72 -21.86
CHINA COSCO 01919.HK 3.92 -1.26 601919.SH 4.07 -0.73 -22.16
MINSHENG BANK 01988.HK 10.38 -0.95 600016.SH 10.9 -0.37 -23.04
CHINA COAL 01898.HK 6.93 -0.43 601898.SH 7.37 -0.41 -24.01
ZMJ 00564.HK 8.99 2.51 601717.SH 9.84 -0.30 -26.16
CHINA SHIP DEV 01138.HK 4.09 -0.73 600026.SH 4.53 0.22 -27.03
CHINA OILFIELD 02883.HK 15.52 -2.39 601808.SH 17.29 -0.46 -27.45
SHENZHENEXPRES 00548.HK 3.02 -0.98 600548.SH 3.37 0.60 -27.58
CITIC BANK 00998.HK 4.76 -1.04 601998.SH 5.35 -0.93 -28.10
CSCL 02866.HK 2.22 -0.45 601866.SH 2.53 2.43 -29.07
BBMG 02009.HK 6.26 -0.32 601992.SH 7.23 1.83 -30.03
GREATWALL
MOTOR 02333.HK 28.1 -1.06 601633.SH 32.81 -2.06 -30.78
HUADIAN POWER 01071.HK 3.77 2.17 600027.SH 4.56 -0.65 -33.18
GUANGZHOU PHAR 00874.HK 25.1 6.36 600332.SH 30.66 10.01 -33.84
DATANG POWER 00991.HK 3.65 -0.55 601991.SH 4.48 0.00 -34.15
GOLDWIND 02208.HK 4.58 2.69 002202.SZ 5.71 0.35 -35.17
SICHUAN EXPRESS 00107.HK 2.54 -0.78 601107.SH 3.33 0.60 -38.35
SH ELECTRIC 02727.HK 3.19 -0.93 601727.SH 4.2 -1.18 -38.62
JIANGXI COPPER 00358.HK 17 -0.47 600362.SH 22.64 -1.14 -39.31
FIRST TRACTOR 00038.HK 7.29 -1.88 601038.SH 9.75 -0.92 -39.57
MCC 01618.HK 1.52 -0.65 601618.SH 2.07 0.00 -40.65
ZIJIN MINING 02899.HK 2.57 0.39 601899.SH 3.52 0.29 -40.99
CHENMING PAPER 01812.HK 2.92 0.69 000488.SZ 4.01 3.35 -41.15
CHALCO 02600.HK 3.17 0.64 601600.SH 4.43 0.23 -42.16
DONGJIANG ENV 00895.HK 45.45 1.00 002672.SZ 68.89 1.31 -46.68
DALIAN PORT 02880.HK 1.81 -2.16 601880.SH 2.78 0.73 -47.38
BEIJING N STAR 00588.HK 1.9 1.60 601588.SH 3.09 -0.32 -50.30
GUANGZHOU SHIP 00317.HK 6.76 -1.17 600685.SH 11.84 -0.92 -53.86
YANZHOU COAL 01171.HK 10.78 0.56 600188.SH 18.91 1.02 -53.93
JINGWEI TEXTILE 00350.HK 6 2.04 000666.SZ 10.99 0.18 -55.88
SHANGHAI PECHEM 00338.HK 3.23 -4.15 600688.SH 6.32 -0.94 -58.70
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HISENSE KELON
SHANDONG XINHUA
CHONGQING IRON
KUNMING MACHINE
NE ELECTRIC
NANJING PANDA
BEIREN PRINTING
TIANJIN CAPITAL
CMOC
LUOYANG GLASS
YIZHENG CHEM
00921.HK
00719.HK
01053.HK
00300.HK
00042.HK
00553.HK
00187.HK
01065.HK
03993.HK
01108.HK
01033.HK
3.91
2.29
1.23
2.32
1.03
2.35
2.56
3.47
3.56
1.74
2.03
7.71
1.78
0.00
-2.93
-0.96
1.29
-1.54
000921.SZ
000756.SZ
601005.SH
600806.SH
000585.SZ
600775.SH
600860.SH
600874.SH
603993.SH
600876.SH
600871.SH
8.01
5.09
3.02
5.99
2.78
6.47
7.1
4.98
-0.78
-0.33
-0.99
1.83
-0.92
-0.14
-60.55
-63.64
-67.09
-68.70
-70.06
-70.64
-70.86
-71.93
-71.96
-74.93
-74.95
SHANDONG
MOLONG 00568.HK 3.57 0.56 002490.SZ 12.45 -1.81 -76.83
ZHEJIANG SHIBAO 01057.HK 2.83 2.17 002703.SZ 15.09 -1.31 -84.84
Last Update: H-shares:2013-03-22 21:10 A-shares:2013 03-22 15:35
(1)Change in local market currency.
(2)Exchange rate: 1 RMB = 1.237320 HKD
Source: AAStocks, http://www.aastocks.com/
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I
-0.86
-0.84
-1.70
-2.87
9.99
10.26
5.61
6.55
-3.01
2.50
-1.23
-0.30
Appendix B - Sample Due Diligence Check List55
Market
* Market size and trends
" Entry barriers (regulations, licenses required for operation, size, captive customers,
etc.)
" Competitive landscape (competitors, size of competitors, commitment to market,
strengths and weaknesses, etc.)
" Growth drivers, historical and projected
" Market risks and opportunities
Business
* Business segments/products/branding
" Manufacturing process
" Company's competitive advantage and areas for improvement
* Development plans for the next three to five years
" Market efforts and pricing strategy
* Major customers and key customer performance indicators
" Key suppliers / third party contractors (key terms, number of suppliers/contractors,
concentrations, etc.)
" Strategic partners
Financials and accountina
0 Capital structure
ss Recreated by the author based on HSBC PIA Initial Due Diligence List, which is co-developed by Mr.
Roger Moh, Ms. Caly Le Xiao, Ms. Karen Yang
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* Capital required and use of proceeds
* Financial forecast
" Auditors' reports and opinions, accounting policies and estimates
" Profit and loss statement - key drivers of revenue and profitability, seasonality /
cyclicality and taxes; explain significant changes in trends / anomalies
" Balance sheet - working capital (including A/R, inventories and A/P), cash position
and indebtedness (including debt maturity), tangible net asset value
* Cash flow statement - working capital changes, depreciation and amortization,
capital expenditures (expansion vs. maintenance) and dividends (dividend policy)
" Contingent liabilities, non-recurring items, tax subsidies, tax compliance
Legal
* Corporate structure and shareholding structure
* Licenses and permits
* AOI, Charter, AOA
* Corporate governance
* Intellectual property rights
* Litigations
* Related party transactions
* Major contracts
Production/operation, R&D. and Intellectual Property
* Location and size of manufacturing facilities; discuss possibility for expansion
* Equipment (imported vs. domestic), major fixed assets by category, age,
leased/owned
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* Manufacturing efficiency (utilization rate / production yield / rework rate, etc.) and
quality control process
* R&D efforts (R&D lead time, staff background, product life cycle, etc.) and
associated risk factors
* Intellectual properties owned or used
Regulatorv
* Regulators, policies and regulations
" Corporate social responsibility
" Approval process
" Evolving trend of laws and regulations
" Politics and government support
HR Management
* Organizational chart and HR policies
* Management (Position, Experience/ CVs, compensation and incentive mechanism)
* Employees (Number break-down by division, benefits)
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Appendix C - Sample Term Sheet
Term Sheet 6
Series _Preferred Stock" Financing of [Company Name]
This term sheet (the "Term Sheet") summarizes the principal terms of the proposed
investment (the "Investment") in, a company incorporated under the laws of the Cayman
Islands (the "Company").
Type of Series _ Preferred Stock
Security:
Amount of A total of US$ shall be raised in the financing. Investor shall
Financing: have the right to invest US$ in the financing.
Pre-Money The fully-diluted pre-money valuation is set at US$_,
Valuation: including all outstanding warrants and options, an unallocated option
pool equal to _% of the post-money capitalization.
Warrants: Any Investor (alone or with its affiliates) investing US$ _ or
more shall receive warrants to purchase additional shares of Series
Preferred Stock equal to _% of the number of Series _
Preferred Shares purchased by the Investor at closing. The warrants
shall have a strike price equal to _% of the original purchase price of
the Series _ Preferred Stock.
The
Founder(s):
5 Institute of Asian Private Equity Investment, "Executive Investment Management Workshop", April, 2011
57 Preferred stock is one of most commonly used financing instruments in growth equity investments in
China
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RIGHTS AND PREFERENCES OF SERIES__ PREFERRED STOCK
Dividend
Preference:
Liquidation
Preference:
The holders of Series _ Preferred will be entitled to receive
noncumulative dividends at the rate of _% per annum on a pari
passu basis with the other series of Preferred Stock (including the
Series _ Preferred Stock, the "Preferred Stock"), when, as and if
declared by the Board, from funds legally available prior to any
distribution with respect to the Common Stock. No dividend shall be
paid on the Common Stock or on any other series of Preferred Stock
at a rate greater than the rate at which dividends are paid on the
Series _ Preferred Stock (on an as-converted basis).
In the event of any liquidation or winding up of the Company, the
holders of Series _ Preferred will be entitled to receive, pari passu
with the holders of other outstanding series of Preferred Stock and in
preference to holders of Common Stock, an amount equal to the
original purchase price plus declared but unpaid dividends. After such
payment, proceeds shall be shared pro rata by the holders of
Common Stock and Preferred Stock (on an as-converted basis).
Liquidation Each of the following events shall be considered a liquidation event
Event which shall entitle the holders of the Preferred Stock to payment of
the amounts described above:
(i) a consolidation or merger of the Company or sale of all or
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Redemption
Rights:
Conversion
Rights:
substantially all of its assets following which the shareholders of the
Company immediately prior to the transaction cease to hold a
majority of the surviving or consolidated company; and (ii) any
transaction (including secondary sales of stock) pursuant to which
any person or group becomes the beneficial owner of a majority of
the voting power of the Company's capital stock (a "Change in
Control").
The Series _ Preferred Stock may be redeemed, in whole or in part,
by the holder after _ years, at cost [plus _% per year], payable
over three years. Redemption of the Series _ Preferred Stock shall
be the holders of the other series of Preferred Stock.
At any time at the option of the holder, each share of Preferred Stock
may be converted into such number of shares of Common Stock as is
equal to the original purchase price divided by the then applicable
conversion price. The conversion price shall initially be equal to the
original purchase price. Additionally, each series of Preferred Stock
will be automatically converted into Common Stock in the event of (i)
an underwritten public offering of the Company's Common Stock with
gross proceeds to the Company of at least [US$_] and an offering
price per share (including underwriting discounts and commissions) of
not less than [US$_J or (ii) the conversion of more than [_%] of
the originally issued shares of such series.
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Anti-dilution The conversion price of the Series _ Preferred Stock (the
Protection: "Conversion Price") will be subject to adjustment for stock splits,
Performance-
Based
Adjustment:
Voting Rights: |
reverse stock splits, and similar events.
The Conversion Price will also be subject to broad-based weighted
average anti-dilution protection.
These adjustments shall not apply to up to shares of common
stock and options to purchase common stock issued to officers,
directors, employees and consultants under plans and agreements
approved by the Company's Board of Directors.
The conversion rate of the Series _ Preferred Stock shall also be
subject to a special adjustment feature as follows: If following the
audit of the Company's financial statements for the Company's fiscal
year ending December 31, _ , the net revenue (excluding
revenues from acquired companies and businesses) of the Company
for such year is less than US$ million, the conversion price shall
be reduced by the same percentage as the percentage by which
actual net revenue is less than US$__ million, subject to a maximum
adjustment of _%].
A holder of Preferred Stock will have the right to that number of votes
equal to the number of shares of Common Stock issuable upon
conversion of the Preferred Stock held by that holder. The Preferred
Stock shall initially be entitled to one vote per share (on an as-if-
converted basis). The Board of Directors will have __ members.
Holders of the Series __ Preferred Stock, voting as a single class,
shall have the right to elect __ member(s) of the board (the "Series __
Director'). The holders of the Preferred Stock shall be entitled to vote
90
Protective
Covenants:
together with the holders of the Common Stock on an as-converted
basis on the election of the remainder of the Board of Directors.
Except as otherwise provided by law or set forth below, the Series
Preferred Stock and the Common Stock shall vote together on all
other matters.
91
Consent of the holders of [ _%] of the Series Preferred Stock,
voting as a separate class, will be required for: (i) creation of any new
class or series of shares having preference to the existing Preferred
Stock with respect to dividends, voting, liquidation preferences, or
conversion rights or the issuance of any debt instrument convertible
into, or debt issued with warrants exerciseable for, any equity
securities of the Company, (ii) any increase in the authorized number
of shares of Preferred Stock, (iii) any amendment to the [Articles of
Incorporation] materially and adversely affecting the Series A
Preferred Stock, (iv) a merger or acquisition of the Company or a sale
of all or substantially all its assets or any other transaction involving a
Change in Control, (v) any redemption or repurchase of shares of
Common Stock (other than from employees, directors and
consultants as approved by the Board of Directors) or Preferred Stock
(other than as contemplated above), (vi) declaration of dividends on
Common Stock, (vii) incur indebtedness for borrowed money in
excess of US$ , (viii) issuance of any equity securities by any
subsidiaries or the entrance into any partnership, joint venture or
profit-sharing agreement or similar arrangement, or (ix) change in the
authorized size of the Board of Directors.
OTHER RIGHTS OF INVESTORS
Indemnification:
Financial
Information and
Inspections:
The Company will indemnify Board members to the greatest extent
permitted under applicable law.
The Company will deliver to each holder of more than shares
of Preferred Stock: (i) within 90 days after the close of the fiscal
year, statements of operations and cash flows for the fiscal year
then ended and a balance sheet as of the date of such year-end
that have been audited by an accounting firm of international
stature; (ii) within 45 days after the close of a fiscal quarter,
unaudited statements of operations and cash flows for the quarter
ended and a balance sheet as of such quarter end; (iii) within 10
days following the end of each calendar month, a profit and loss
statement and balance sheet for such month which also discloses
the variance of each item from budget;12 and (iv) not less than 60
days prior to the end of each fiscal year, management's proposed
budget for the coming year. These obligations will terminate upon a
public offering of Common Stock. The Company shall permit each
holder of more than shares of Series __ Preferred Stock
Investor, upon reasonable notice and at such Investor's expense, to
visit and inspect the Company's properties, to examine its books of
account and records (and make copies thereof and take extracts
therefrom) and to discuss the Company's affairs, finances and
accounts with its officers, all at such reasonable times during
ordinary business hours as may be requested in writing by the
Investor. The information and inspection rights shall not be in
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Registration
Rights:
Right of
Participation:
limitation of any rights that any Investor may have with respect to
the books and records of the Company, or to inspect their properties
or discuss their affairs, finances and accounts, under the laws of the
jurisdiction in which it is incorporated.
For the purpose of this Term Sheet, an IPO is an initial public offer
of shares or securities of the Company, or an entity that
incorporates substantially all of the businesses of the Company, on
a stock exchange. In the event of an IPO in which the disposal of
securities is subject to registration with securities regulatory
authorities or the availability of an exemption from such registration,
the Investors shall be entitled to the customary registration rights.
Each holder of at least shares of Preferred Stock shall have a
pro rata right (based on its percentage ownership of the Preferred
Stock) to participate in future equity financings of the Company
(except for options to purchase up to shares of
Common Stock reserved under the employee reserve pool and
except for acquisitions, license and joint venture agreements and
other customary exclusions). Any securities not subscribed for by
any holder of Preferred Stock shall be reallocated among the
participating holders. This right will not apply to, and will terminate
immediately prior to, an IPO.
Right of First Each holder of at least shares of Preferred Stock shall have
Refusal: a secondary right of first refusal to purchase their pro rata portion of
any shares of Common Stock that a Founder may seek to sell (other
than customary sales to family members and family trusts and
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Right of Co-
Sale:
distributions to partners and similar beneficial owners, all of whom
shall be similarly bound ("Exempt Transfers")) and which the
Company opts not to purchase. This right does not apply to, and will
terminate immediately prior to the consummation of an IPO.
To the extent that shares of Common Stock offered by a Founder
are not purchased through the exercise of rights of first refusal
described above, the holders of the Preferred Stock shall have a
right of co-sale (based on their ownership of the Company's
outstanding capital stock) in the event that a Founder wishes to sell
any of his shares to a third party (other than Exempt Transfers). This
right will terminate immediately prior to an IPO or change of control.
The holders of the Preferred Stock and the Founders shall have a
right of co-sale with respect to proposed sales of shares of
Preferred Stock (other than Exempt Transfers) that a holder wishes
to sell. No Founder or holder of Preferred Stock shall make any sale
of shares in any transaction or series of transactions constituting a
Change in Control unless the acquirer offers to purchase all shares
held by such persons and the price paid to the holders of the
Preferred Stock is at least as great as what the holders of the
Preferred Stock would receive upon liquidation of the Company.
Sale of the If, after , 200_, an unaffiliated third party makes a bona
Company: fide offer to purchase all of the capital stock of the Company or
substantially all of the Company's assets and the holders of
[ _%] of the Series __ Preferred Stock elect to sell, the
Founders shall have 30 days to match the offer (and obtain a firm
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0
commitment for the financing, if applicable), and failing their ability
to do so, they shall sell their shares or vote to sell the Company's
assets to the third party on the same terms.
OTHER TERMS
Vesting of
Founders'
Shares:
Each of the Founders shall enter into a Restricted Stock Agreement
with the Company providing the Company with (and, if the Company
does not exercise this right, the holders of the Preferred Stock on a
pro rata basis among them) the right to repurchase from the
Founder all of his shares of Common Stock of the Company should
his employment with the Company cease, for any reason, prior to
, 200_. Shares shall "vest" monthly on a straight-line
basis. The purchase price shall be the Founder's cost.
Stock Option The Company shall establish a stock option program covering 20%
Plan: of the issued capital of the Company from time to time (subject to
the cap of 20% of the issued capital at the closing of the Second
Investment) for participation by selected employees of the Company
from time to time.
Market Standoff: Each purchaser of the Series Preferred Stock shall enter into an
agreement whereby if requested by the Company or the lead
managing underwriter of the Company's IPO, such person will not
sell, assign, pledge or otherwise transfer (or take any short
equivalent position with respect to) his shares until the expiration of
180 days following the effectiveness of the Company's registration
statement, provided that this obligation shall only apply if each of the
Company's officers, directors and holders of 1% or more of the fully-
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diluted capital stock is also subject to such obligation.
Confidential Each officer and employee of the Company has entered, and each
Information and person serving in any such capacity in the future will enter, into the
Inventions Company's standard Employee Confidential Information and
Agreement: Inventions Agreement.
Use of The Company shall use the proceeds from the sale of the Series _
Proceeds: Preferred Stock for business expansion, capital expenditures and
general working capital and for any other purpose approved by the
holders of at least a majority of the Series _ Preferred Stock.
Expenses: The Company will pay at the Closing the reasonable legal fees and
expenses incurred by a single counsel to all Investors.
From the date of acceptance of this Term Sheet until the earlier of
(i) , 2001 and (ii) the date this transaction is
abandoned by the Investor (the "Exclusivity Termination Date"), the
Company, the Founders and each of its officers and directors (1)
shall deal exclusively with the Investor in connection with the
issuance and sale of capital stock of the Company; (2) shall not
solicit, or engage others to solicit, offers for the purchase or
acquisition of any capital stock of the Company or all or any
substantial part of the assets or for any merger or consolidation; and
(3) shall not negotiate, entertain discussions or enter into any
agreements or understandings with any other person with respect to
any such transaction. During such exclusivity period, the Company
will cooperate in good faith to facilitate the due diligence
investigations by the Investors and their counsel and other
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Exclusivity:
Confidentiality:
representatives. The Exclusivity Termination Date shall be
automatically extended to , 2001, if on or prior to
, 2001, Investor shall have made a capital call to its
limited partners for funds necessary to pay the purchase price of the
Series __ Preferred Stock.
Upon acceptance of this Term Sheet, the Company will not solicit
other potential investors nor disclose the terms of this Term Sheet to
other persons (other than in connection with consummation of the
transactions contemplated in this Term Sheet) prior to termination of
this Term Sheet and shall use their best endeavor to procure their
respective representatives to observe this obligation.
This term sheet is only a framework upon which the Investors and the Company may
discuss a proposed equity investment by the Investors in the Company, is not intended
to constitute a binding agreement or an offer that is capable of acceptance and shall not
be deemed to create any legally enforceable rights in favor of any of the Investors or the
Company. Without limiting the foregoing, until such time as the Investors and the
Company have executed definitive binding documentation, any Investor may terminate
negotiations in its sole discretion without liability therefor.
INVESTOR
By:
Name:
Title:
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THE FOUNDER(S) and THE COMPANY:
For the Company and, where applicable, for themselves:
Printed Name:
Title:
Printed Name:
Title :
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